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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship
between the financial condition of defense contractors and the
amount of Department of Defense spending from 1975 to 1990.
The sample for this study consists of eighteen major defense
contractors. The relationships are examined at two levels.
The first level is that of the financial condition of the
defense industry in the aggregate. The second level is that
of the individual defense contractors. The major findings of
this study are that: 1) the aggregate industry of defense
contractors has experienced a declining financial condition
from 1975 to 1990; 2) a positive relationship seems to exist
between the financial condition of the defense industry and
the amount of defense spending; 3) no consistent relationship
between the financial condition of the individual defense
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I . INTRODUCTION
The size of the National Defense Budget has provided much
heated debate throughout the years. Those in favor of
increased defense spending engage those opposed at all levels
from the electorate to the legislators. "How much should our
nation spend on defense?" is a question which has no
definitive right or wrong answer. Only subjective answers
pers i st
.
Defense spending has had a tremendous impact on the
economy in several regions of the United States and on several
industries. As defense spending has risen or fallen, so to
has the "prosperity" of those regions and industries directly
related to defense. (Craig, 1988 and Gansler, 1980)
Those opposed to huge defense budgets focus on the social
and educational problems and the decaying infrastructure that
could be addressed by less defense spending. Even President
Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of too strong a military-
industrial complex in the 1950's. He believed that the
resources of the nation could be more efficiently and
productively used in the market economy (Enthoven and Smith,
1971, pp. 8-9).
Those in favor of increased defense spending argue in the
non-quantifiable terms of ensuring national security and
expound on the many civilian uses of defense-related
technologies. It is also emphasized that the complexity of
modern weaponry requires more specialized production equipment
and longer production times than weaponry used in the past.
The last twenty years are a graphic example of the cyclic
nature of defense spending. Defense spending peaked during
the Vietnam War and fell quickly afterwards and throughout the
Ford administration. Small increases to defense spending were
made during the Carter administration. A steep military
buildup lead to the highest levels of defense spending in
United States history during the Reagan administration. Since
1985, the defense budget has steadily declined.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the new openness in Eastern
Europe, and the breakup of the Soviet Union have lead many
advocates to demand a huge peace dividend. But the impact of
defense cuts goes beyond just the United States Armed Forces.
The cuts will also affect local economies, the United States
military industrial base, and the ability of many military
contractors to continue as viable entities. Defense spending
reductions have wide spread impacts and strategic
impl icat ions
.
President Bush has stated that one of the major strategies
that the United States has embraced in the New World Order is
the ability to reconstitute its forces if the need should
arise (Bush, 1990, p. 5 and The White House, 1991, pp. 29-31).
An important factor in force recons t i tut ion is the ability of
the United States industrial base to meet military surge
requirements. This ability will surely be limited if major
military contractors are financially weakened by cuts in
defense spending.
A. OBJECTIVE
The research question examined is: What impact does the
amount of Department of Defense spending have on the financial
condition of major military prime contractors?
This study did not attempt to fully answer the broad
questions of future recons t
i
tut i on capabilities and overall
industrial base impacts by the present Department of Defense
(DoD) spending reduction projection, but rather it sheds some
light on a small portion of these major questions. The
reported financial data of eighteen defense contractors was
analyzed in order to relate the financial health of these
companies to the changes that have occurred in defense
spending levels over the past sixteen years. The selected
contractors are a representative sample of the largest defense
contractors
.
The period from 1975 to 1990 was chosen for the
fluctuations of defense spending and economic conditions
during the period and for the availability of data. It is not
considered that the past sixteen years are representative of
future eras or previous eras. The intent of this study is to
shed light on these sixteen years as a basis for future study
of what could be expected to occur.
In analyzing the research question, the approach used was
to identify top DoD contractors and determine their "financial
health" based upon an accepted model. The financial health of
the contractors was then related to DoD spending by using
linear regression statistical techniques.
In the data collection process, there were limits on
source materials and periodic changes in accounting
conventions. Generally, the accounting data was standardized
to conform to currently valid financial statement definitions.
B. FINDINGS
The findings of this study show that a positive
relationship probably exists between the amount of defense
spending and the financial health of the aggregate defense
contractors used to represent a portion of the defense
industry in this study. However at the individual contractor
level, the relationship between defense spending and the
financial condition for individual contractors is not clear.
Much of the haziness of the relationships can be attributed to
how the management of each contractor responds to the changing
environment vice just the amount of DoD spending.
C. METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted in seven major steps: 1)
literature review, 2) statement of research hypotheses, 3)
planning the sample, 4) conceptualizing the constructs and
measures, 5) collecting the data, 6) structuring the
relationships to be tested, and 7) analyzing the data with
statistical techniques.
The first step was to conduct a literature review of
defense spending and its impact on the financial condition of
defense contractors. This review provided an overall
qualitative assessment of how defense spending is measured,
its fluctuations over the past sixteen years, and previous
related studies on this topic. Further literature reviews
were conducted on financial ratio analysis and models for
determining the financial condition of companies.
The second step was to state the research hypothesis.
This hypothesis and further questions flowed from the
literature review. Further hypotheses were developed stating
the relationships expected between various DoD spending
measures, contractor financial condition measures, and control
variables
.
During the third step, the planning of the sample was
performed. This entailed defining the major defense
contractors in order to select a representative sample. A
balance was sought to ensure that the sample was large enough
to be statistically significant yet small enough to be
analyzed within the available time constraints imposed on this
study. Eighteen defense contractors were selected for the
sampl e
.
The fourth step entailed conceptualizing the constructs
and developing measures designed to reflect the constructs.
Three areas were studied to fully develop the constructs and
measures in this step. First, the dependant variables
(financial condition of defense contractors) were
conceptualized and measured. Textbooks, ratio studies, and
previous studies on defense contractors were reviewed to
identify the dimensions of the financial condition for defense
contractors best suited for this study.
Second, the independent variable (DoD spending) was
conceptualized and measured. Relevant dimensions of DoD
spending were identified to select the most representative
measure that impacts DoD contractors. Defense outlays, total
defense prime contract awards, and the sum of procurement and
research and development outlays were reviewed for this
measure. Along with each of these dimensions of DoD spending,
the yearly change of each variable was determined and included
as a relevant measure of the impact of DoD spending on the
financial health of the contractors. Some of the other
independent measures identified included DoD outlays as a
percentage of GNP, DoD spending as a percentage of total
federal spending, and total prime contract awards as a
percentage of DoD spending.
Finally, control variables were conceptualized and
measured. These were used to take into consideration other
factors that can reasonably be expected to impact the
financial condition of defense contractors. Control variables
that were assessed include GNP, industry capacity utilization,
and the percentage of DoD business for each contractor.
The fifth step involved collecting the required data for
this study. General data on the defense contractors were
available through standard references at the Knox Library and
annual financial reports. Detailed information on DoD
spending was also available at Knox Library in several
government published reports. Data to measure the control
variables were available through published government reports.
In the sixth step, the analysis of the relationships
between the independent and dependant variables began by
structuring the relationships to be tested. The tests were
conducted on two levels. First, relationships between DoD
spending variables and variables reflecting the aggregate
defense contractor financial condition were tested. Second,
relationships between DoD spending and the financial condition
of individual firms were examined.
The seventh step involved using statistical techniques for
the following three purposes:
1. To provide descriptive information on the dependant,
independent, and control variables individually. This
was done using means, standard deviations, and ranges.
2. To provide an initial picture of the interrelationships
between the chosen variables using pairwise correlation.
Outcomes of this analysis were: 1) some of the variables
were highly related and thus measured the same
constructs; 2) indications of strong relationships
between the dependant and independent variables were
revealed.
3. To provide a formal model of relationships between the
dependant and independent variables while considering the
control variables. Regression was used for this model.
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter I
provides the introduction for this study by stating the
research objectives, findings, and methodology. Chapter II
lays out a background on the national and defense budget to
provide an historical perspective on past fluctuations in
defense spending. It also provides the basis for selecting
the independent measures of defense spending that were later
related to the financial condition of the defense contractors.
The next two chapters discuss the methodology and analysis
used for this study. Chapter III details the seven step
procedure undertaken to conduct this research. The problems
and limitations on this study are also described in this
chapter. Chapter IV provides the analysis of the data
obtained and developed throughout this study.
Chapter V summarizes the major findings and conclusions
that this study has reached.
II. HISTORICAL BUDGET BACKGROUND
The period from 1975 to 1990 experienced economic shifts
which impacted all sectors of American industry. In the late
1970's, high inflation and interest rate swings affected the
economy. This period was followed be a period of recession
from 1980 to 1983. The recession aided in easing interest
rates and inflation. From 1984 to 1990, the United States
underwent its longest peacetime economic expansion as the
gross national product (GNP) continued to grow throughout the
period. Not until the second half of 1990 did another
recession begin. Interest rates dropped from their early 1980
highs but maintained a level higher than historical averages.
Figure 1 shows the changes of the prime rate, GNP, and
inflation (GNP deflator) from 1974 to 1990.
Just as the rest of American industry had to face these
economic fluctuations, so too did the defense industry.
Increased attention was directed at studying the impact of
these economic conditions on the ability of the defense
industry to meet defense needs. Congressional hearings,
Department of Defense memorandums, and various studies were
conducted to assess and address the challenges these






Inflation is measured by GNP deflator.
Source: Economic Indicators
Figure 1. Prime Rate, GNP Change, and Inflation
A. NATIONAL AND DEFENSE BUDGETS
A basic understanding of the national and defense budgets
over the period is needed to place the research question in
context. This background serves two functions in relation to
the rest of this study. First, the fluctuations of the
defense budgets over the period are noted. Second, this
background provides the basis for determining which measures
best capture how these defense budget fluctuations impact the
financial condition of the defense contractors.
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In discussing the national budget, the distinction is made
between budget authority and budget outlays. Budget authority
is that amount which Congress annually authorizes and
appropriates to spend. Budget outlays is the annual amount
that is actually expended. Budget authority and outlays
differ due to reprogramming , sequestration, and impoundment
act ions .
'
The salient point here is that outlays reflect the actual
amount expended in a twelve month period (fiscal year). This
actual expenditure is what impacts the defense contractors.
Therefore "outlays reflect the total burden of national
defense as a component of the total United States federal
defense budget; they are an appropriate measure of national
security spending in an economic sense." (Lewis, 1990, p. 17)
'Budget authority is sometimes confused with total
obligational authority (TOA) . Budget authority refers to that
amount which Congress allows DoD to spend regardless of the
year the funds become outlays. Budget authority must be
converted to outlays within a certain number of years,
depending on the account, or they will expire. Total
obligational authority is a DoD specific term which includes
all revenues from Congress, foreign sales, and the sale of
assets, etc. Many studies use TOA as a measure of defense
spending ability. Budget authority and TOA are normally very
similar since the vast majority of DoD spending is from
Congressional appropriations.
One further distinction is between the terms DoD Budget
Authority and National Defense Authority. National Defense
Authority includes defense spending by other government
agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE), which is the
largest non-DoD spender on national defense. In current-year
dollars, DOE ' s contribution to national defense has risen from
1.5 to 9.0 billion dollars between 1975 and 1990. This paper
will consider defense spending to include all defense-related
spending by all government agencies unless otherwise stated.
1 1
Figure 2 is a graph of DoD Budget Authority and DoD Budget
Outlays from 1965 to 1990 and shows the fluctuations in
defense spending. Budget authority is normally a leading
indicator of outlays.
280
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Figure 2. Defense Outlays and Defense Authority
The 1975 to 1980 period was preceded by a steep decline of
United States military spending after defense outlays peaked
in 1968 during the Vietnam War. Not only did defense spending
decline from 1969 to 1975, but manpower levels were reduced;
and quality, morale, and readiness were greatly impaired
(Lewis, 1990, p. 25)
.
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From 1975 to 1980, a limited expansion in the military
occurred due to the sharp declines from the Vietnam era and
due to the improvements made by the Soviet military. Also
contributing to this slight military spending increase were
world events highlighted by the fall of the Shah of Iran and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
During the first Reagan administration, an unprecedented
peacetime military expansion was conducted. In constant 1982
dollars though, military spending did not exceeded the Vietnam
War high in 1968 of $254.8 million until 1989 when it reached
$256.6 million. Defense budget authority peaked in 1985 which
signalled the coming decline in defense spending. Defense
outlays peaked in 1989. The events in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991 continue to put pressure on
policy makers to further decrease the military budget.
Studies on the federal budget from the end of World War II
to the present show that total federal budget outlays grew at
nearly $21 billion a year in constant 1988 dollars. (This is
equivalent to $18.3 billion 1982 dollars.) Defense spending,
with its peaks and valleys, oscillates around $233 billion per
year in 1988 dollars ($203 billion in 1982 dollars). On the
other hand, non-defense spending has continued to grow since
the early 1960's due to entitlement programs, social program
expansion, and debt financing. (Lewis, 1990, pp. 40-41)
Figure 3 demonstrates these findings from 1974 to 1990.
13
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Figure 3. National and Defense Outlays
Figure 4 shows how defense spending as a percentage of the
total federal budget outlays has varied over the past sixteen
years. The high over the period was in 1974 at 29.5 percent.
The low occurred in 1980 at 22.7 percent. The present trend
appears to be headed lower from its 1990 level of 23.9
percent
.
Figure 5 shows how the federal budget outlays and total
defense outlays as a percentage of GNP have varied from 1974
to 1990. The total federal budget outlays as a percentage of
GNP have varied between 19 percent in 1974 to a high of 23.9
percent in 1983. Total defense outlays as a percentage of GNP
14
PERCENT
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
YEAR
Source: OMB
Figure 4. Defense Outlays/National Outlays
have ranged from a low of 4.8 percent in 1979 to a high of 6.5
percent in 1986. Projections from the Secretary of Defense
are that the percentage of defense spending to GNP will reach
4.0 percent by 1995, a fifty year low (Hearings, 1990). The
average defense to GNP ratio from 1947 to 1988 was 7.7 percent
with an average rate of change of -0.2 percent (Lewis, 1990,
p. 45).
The Constitution states that the Congress has the
responsibility "to raise and support Armies" and "to provide
and maintain a Navy". While the President is the Commander-
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Figure 5. National Outlays/GNP and Defense Outlays/GNP
determines the size and make-up of those forces by holding the
"power of the purse". It is this control of resources for the
armed forces that has provided Congress the oversight
responsibility and influence it possesses. This oversight has
increased in recent years due to pork barrel politics, lack of
trust between the Congress and DoD due to "overpricing
scandals", and the amount of the discretionary federal budget
in the DoD budget. 2
The discretionary portion of the federal budget is money
that Congress can vary in level without changing existing
entitlements or benefits, many of which are indexed to
inf lat ion.
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The roots of mi cromanagement of DoD activities can also be
traced to a federal spending disparity. By 1985, although
the defense budget represented only about 26 percent of
total federal outlays, it accounted for nearly 65 percent
of total discretionary spending. (Fox, 1988, p. 83)
The Defense budget structure is typically broken down into
five major titles or appropriation accounts which fall under
two types. Expense-type appropriations are (1) Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) and (2) Military Personnel. Investment-type
appropriations are (1) Procurement, (2) Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) , and (3) Miscellaneous to include
Military Construction, Family Housing, and other accounts for
management trust funds, revolving funds, foreign currency
translations, etc.
Historically, procurement has been the largest individual
title of the DoD budget since it is based on major acquisition
programs for tanks, aircraft, ships, and missiles. However,
in the 1970's, O&M was larger than procurement (Lewis, 1990,
p. 72). Procurement peaked in 1987 and has since tended to
decline due to cutbacks in defense budget authority and
outlays. Figure 6 shows the defense budget broken into its
major appropriation categories.
Figure 7 shows the same data as in Figure 6 except that it
relates all the accounts as a percentage of total DoD
spending. The investment accounts were below historical
levels in the 1970's, increased in the 1980's, and never
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Source: OMB
Figure 6. Defense Budget by Subfunction
The study by Kevin Lewis (1990) on the defense budget
points out that when the defense budget has changed, the
procurement appropriations are the most volatile of all the
defense accounts. During increases and decreases in defense
spending, procurement has respectively increased and decreased
proportionately more than has the other accounts. Research
and development has remained fairly consistent at around ten
percent of the defense budget.
Procurement is, in some sense, the "slack variable" of the
DoD. Regardless of the direction of budget movement,
procurement authority is the most affected component
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Figure 7. Defense Budget by Subfunction (Percent)
The Procurement Title is considered to be the "slack
variable" since it can be expanded rapidly to procure
additional quantities of end items. The Procurement Title
line items are usually funding-limited and not production-
limited. Therefore, program requirements are spread over a
period of several years to lessen impact for funds and not to
restrict the industrial base. When an influx of increased
budget authority is inserted into the Procurement Title,
individual buy quantities are increased to deliver the needed
items earlier. Conversely, when a significant decrease in
19
defense budget authority occurs, the Procurement Title can be
reduced rapidly.
The operations of the forces can be changed; but to have
the same effect that changes in procurement outlays have, a
large amount of operational exercises would have to be
affected which would then impact on military readiness.
Military personnel levels also can not be altered quickly
enough to affect the military personnel account to the same
extent that alterations in procurement outlays can impact
overall defense spending.
The implication this large variability in the procurement
account has on this study is that whereas defense budget
outlays have varied over time, the procurement accounts within
the defense outlays have varied to an even greater extent.
The larger variability in the procurement account is more
directly felt by major DoD contractors than is overall
variability of the defense outlays in total.
B. DOD PRIME CONTRACTORS
Department of Defense prime contractors include parent
companies and their subsidiaries which provide worldwide
contract actions of supply, service, and construction to DoD.
The amount of DoD contracts awarded to prime contractors
is dependent on the annual amount appropriated by the
Congress. The majority of dollars in DoD prime contracts
awarded is from the procurement and RDT&E appropriations for
20
major weapon system acquisition. However, a substantial
amount of major contract dollars is also appropriated in O&M
for service contracts for such items as telephone service,
fuel oil, base support, and other operational type
requirements
.
Figure 8 shows the amount of prime contracts awarded from
1974 to 1990. Comparing the cycles in Figures 1 and 8 shows
that defense cycles have not necessarily coincided with the
rest of the economic cycles. DoD prime contract awards
steadily grew from $73 billion in 1975 to $137.1 billion in
1985, an 88 percent increase. The largest increases occurred
during the first two years of the Reagan administration. From
1985 to 1990, the DoD prime contract awards began to decline
in current dollars. When constant dollars are considered, the
decline is even sharper. Therefore, the defense industry must
now compete for even less dollars that are available for
defense prime contracts yet meet the cutting-edge of
technology demands of DoD.
The source of information used for determining the amount
of annual DoD prime contract awards and the companies that
received them was 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar
of Prime Contract Awards, a DoD Directorate for Information,
Operations, and Reports (DIOR) annual publication. Some noted
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Source: 100 Largest Prime Contractors
Figure 8. DOD Prime Contract Awards
1. From 1975 to 1982, the prime contract awards were based
on contracts greater than $10,000. Since 1983, the
publication has been based on awards greater than
$25,000.
2. The prime contract awards listing does include research
and development contracts but does not include contracts
made by other U.S. Government agencies and financed with
DoD funds
.
3. The prime contract awards as a percentage of budget
authority ranged from 41.5 percent to 54.1 percent.
4. The top 100 companies listed each year received between
65.8 percent and 70.1 percent of the total contracts
awarded
.
5. The eighteen companies selected in this study
cumulatively received between 33.2 percent and 45.0
percent of the total DoD contracts awarded with a
cumulative total from 1975 to 1990 of 41.0 percent.
22
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has highlighted the fluctuations in
government defense spending over the past sixteen years. It
also has pointed out that total defense outlays are not
necessarily the best indicator of the impact that defense
spending has on defense contractors. A better indicator is
the amount of annual prime contracts awarded, although there
are limitations in this measure that will be discussed in
Chapter III. Finally, of the total amount of defense prime
contract awards, a select few contractors have received a
large percentage of the contracts. This fact provides the
opportunity to study and analyze this select group of
contractors to evaluate findings which would be applicable to
the entire defense industry.
23
III. METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the process used to study the
research question. The process entailed seven steps which
include: 1) a literature review, 2) statement of research
hypothesis, 3) planning the sample, 4) conceptualizing the
constructs and measures, 5) collecting the data, 6)
structuring the relationships to be tested, and 7) analyzing
the data with statistical techniques.
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review was conducted in four areas: (1)
studies on the national and defense budgets, which were
summarized in Chapter II, to determine the best measures to
use for the independent variable of defense spending, (2)
previous studies on the financial condition of defense
contractors to assess the depth and the methods used for
analysis in these earlier studies, (3) financial ratio studies
to assist in determining which financial ratios to use in
evaluating the financial condition of the defense contractors,
and (4) models of the financial condition of firms, including
bankruptcy-related models, to provide a single summary measure
of financial health.
24
1. Studies on Defense Contractors
Although much has been written about the defense
industry in the popular press, there are few in-depth reports
or analyses that have been conducted on the financial
condition of DoD contractors. Numerous analyses have been
performed on the closely related themes of defense contractor
profitability or the prediction of defense contractor
financial distress.
This section briefly describes six studies on defense
contractors that were reviewed to provide an impression of
related previous studies and their conclusions. These studies
shed some light on what independent and control variables
should be considered for this analysis.
In 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Management) chartered the Defense Financial And Investment
Review (DFAIR) . Its objectives were to study and make
recommendations concerning contract pricing, financing, and
profit policies to determine if public funds were being spent
efficiently. The study was also structured to determine the
status of the defense industrial base. The period covered in
the DFAIR was 1975 to 1983. In effect, this review was an
extension of an earlier study called "Profit '76" which had
similar objectives in reviewing the 1970 to 1974 period. The
DFAIR concluded that the interests of the taxpayer were being
protected, and the defense industry was achieving an equitable
return for its defense business (DFAIR, 1985, p. E-l).
25
A General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the DFAIR
study questioned the methodology used in the DoD study and
concluded that defense industry profits were actually greater
than those in the commercial sector (GAO, 1986, p. 2).
A Naval Postgraduate School thesis by John Morse and
Kenyon Kramer in 1985 titled DoD Contractor Profitability
1 980-1 984 also concluded that during the period studied, DoD
prime contractors were more profitable and exposed to less
risk than like-size commercial businesses (Morse and Kramer,
1985, p. 67).
In the October 1986 issue of Management Science,
Willis Greer and Shu Liao, two professors at the Naval
Postgraduate School, published an article titled "An Analysis
of Risk and Return in the Defense Market: Its Impact on
Weapon System Competition". One of the conclusions of this
study was that capacity utilization rate has a significant
impact on the variation of defense business profitability
(Greer and Liao, 1986, p. 1259). This conclusion relates to
this study in that capacity utilization does impact on defense
contractor financial condition and should be considered as a
control variable.
Another study of defense contractors is an annually
updated report for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development, Acquisition) by RRG Associates
entitled Financial Analysis of Major Defense Contractors 1977-
26
1989. This report is essentially a compilation of the annual
reports and selected financial ratios of twenty-three defense
contractors. The number of companies in the report has varied
due to acquisitions and mergers over the period. Some
aggregate data on return on sales, return on assets, and
reinvestment rates is calculated for the defense contractors
and compared with commercial business ratios. However, little
analysis other than the presentation of the raw data of the
individual firms is presented.
In 1991 while working for the Center for Naval
Analysis, Michael Treglia wrote a research memorandum titled
"Financial Analysis of the Major Defense Contractors." In
this paper, the financial performance of twelve major DoD
prime contractors from 1984 to 1989 was analyzed. Nine
financial ratios of the twelve prime contractors were
aggregated and compared with similar nonfinancial corporate
business data. Relative performance of each individual firm
was then provided. His conclusions were: (1) the major DoD
prime contractors had trouble adjusting to the declines in DoD
spending in the second half of the 1980's; (2) low returns by
these firms has made their ability to attract equity financing
more difficult; (3) increased debt by the firms has raised the
cost of financing for these firms; and (4) with decreased DoD
procurement, the trend will lead to fewer resources and fewer
firms in the defense industry. (Treglia, 1991, p. 29)
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2. Financial Ratio Reviews
The literature review on financial ratios was
conducted to assess which measures of performance would best
capture the financial condition of the defense contractors.
A general overview of financial ratios was conducted and
followed by a more detailed review of studies on financial
rat io analys is
.
At first, a general review of frequently used
financial ratios and what each measured was conducted. For
this portion, three sources were consulted which included:
(1) Financial Account ing: An Introduction to Concepts
,
Methods, and Uses by Sidney Davidson, Clyde Stickney, and
Roman Weil; (2) Corporate Financial Report ing and Analys is by
David Hawkins; and (3) Financial Management Theory and
Practice by Eugene Brigham and Louis Gapenski.
The financial ratio literature review was then
extended to determine which of the numerous available ratios
would apply to this study. Three articles were utilized to
assist in determining the classification, number, and types of
ratios that would be most useful in assessing the financial
condition of a firm.
The first article was "The Stability of Financial
Patterns in Industrial Organizations" by George Pinches, Kent
Mingo, and J. Kent Caruthers (Pinches, et al., 1973). This
article developed empirically based classifications of
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financial ratios and measured the long-term stability of these
classifications from 1951-1969. Seven classifications were
developed based on mul t i-var iate analysis using data from
COMPUSTAT tapes 1 to include: (1) Return on Investment; (2)
Capital Intens i veness ; (3) Inventory Intens i veness ; (4)
Financial Leverage; (5) Receivables Intens i veness ; (6) Short-
term Liquidity; and (7) Cash Position.
The second article consulted was "The Hierarchical
Classification of Financial Ratios" by the George Pinches,
Kent Mingo, and Arthur Eubank, and J. Kent Caruthers (Pinches,
et al., 1975). This study differed from the earlier Pinches,
et al
.
, study in that short-term stability of financial ratio
groups was analyzed from 1966-1969. Again a COMPUSTAT tape
was utilized for the study. A hierarchical classification of
the ratios in each of the seven classifications based on
factor loading (correlation with the classification) was
developed. Three conclusions from this article pertain to
this thesis: (1) some financial ratios are similar and can be
grouped into classifications; (2) a selected set of financial
ratios can be utilized to represent nearly all aspects of the
condition of a firm; (3) the financial ratios that are
selected should possess the desired predictive significance.
'COMPUSTAT is a computer data base of financial
information on thousands of publicly traded companies updated
yearly and produced by Standard & Poor's Services, Inc.
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The third article reviewed was "An Empirical Analysis
of Useful Financial Ratios" by Kung Chen and Thomas Shimerda
(Chen and Shimerda, 1981). This study analyzed several other
financial ratio studies including the above mentioned Pinches,
et al
.
, studies. The main conclusions were: (1) financial
ratios can be classified by a substantially reduced number of
factors; (2) the ratios classified by the same factor are
highly correlated, and the selection of one ratio to represent
a factor can account for most of the information provided by
all the ratios of that factor; (3) inclusion of more than one
ratio from a factor leads to mul t i col 1 inear i ty and distorts
the relationship between dependent and independent variables;
(4) concerted effort should be applied to selecting the most
representative ratios of these factors, not necessarily the
ratio with the highest absolute factor loadings.
3. Financial Condition Models
Three different models which provide a measure of the
financial condition of a firm were reviewed to determine which
model would be applicable to this study. The three models
were the Altman bankruptcy model, the Dagel and Pepper model
on the financial distress of DoD hardware contractors, and the
Zavgren vulnerability logistic model. Each model relies on
several individual financial ratios and combines values for
those ratios into a single summary index or indicator of the
financial health or condition of a firm.
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Altman described his model of corporate bankruptcy
prediction in a classic article in the September 1968 issue of
the Journal of Finance (Altman, 1968). This model was
slightly modified for easier use in his 1983 book entitled
Corporate Financial Distress (Altman, 1983). His model only
captures two of the ratio classifications in the Pinches, et
al . studies and has two less utilized ratios, retained
earnings over total assets and market value of equity over
book value of total liabilities. A better model to determine
overall financial condition for a defense firm was desired for
thi s thes i s .
In 1989 while working for the Naval Center for Cost
Analysis, Harold Dagel and Ranae Pepper wrote an unpublished
paper entitled "A Financial Distress Model for DoD Hardware
Contractors" (Dagel and Pepper, 1989). They developed a model
for assessing the financial health of DoD contractors to be
used as a predictor of potential financial distress. The
paper estimated the model accuracy in predicting financial
distress at 93 percent.
The Dagel and Pepper model has the benefit of being
developed for a DoD contractor sample which would make it
suitable for this study on DoD contractors. The one drawback
in this model is that it has six variables which represent
only three of the Pinches, et al . , seven classifications. The
Dagel and Pepper model has four variables which reflect
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liquidity. This may be justified for predicting financial
distress; but to determine overall financial condition for a
firm, it was originally felt that a model which covered more
aspects of the firm may be better suited for this thesis.
However, the financial condition of the defense contractors
selected for analysis in this thesis was determined using the
Dagel and Pepper model primarily because the model was based
on DoD contractors.
Zavgren used logistic analysis to develop a model
utilizing one ratio from each of Pinches, et al., seven
classification factors to predict failure in firms (Zavgren,
1985). The model was based on data from COMPUSTAT and was not
defense industry specific, but the sample was limited to
American firms. This model was originally selected as the
basis to determine the financial condition of the defense
contractors since it utilized the most complete set of
components to develop a "snapshot" view of firms.
4. Literature Review Summary
In summary of the literature review, major accounts of
the defense budget have varied over the past sixteen years in
a measurable and significant way. There are numerous
indicators that are used as measures for defense spending.
The one most promising for this study is the amount of annual
DoD prime contract awards.
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The firms listed as top defense contractors do not
drastically change from year to year. When change does occur,
it is normally due to acquisitions or mergers among the top
defense contractors. The top defense contractors, as a group,
garner a significant portion of DoD contract awards each year.
No known studies have attempted to directly link the
financial condition of defense contractors to the amount of
defense spending, although numerous studies have been
performed on defense contractors profitability. Two of the
reviewed models were selected as possibly providing the best
indication of the financial condition of defense contractors
for this study, the Zavgren model and the Dagel and Pepper
model. The Zavgren model was chosen since it encompasses the
widest array of financial aspects of the models reviewed. The
Dagel and Pepper model was also selected since it was derived
specifically for DoD contractors.
B. HYPOTHESIS
Based on the literature review, it was hypothesized that
a relationship exists between the amount of defense spending
and the financial health of defense industry companies. The
relationship hypothesized was linear and positive such that as
defense spending increases, the financial health of major
defense contractors increases.
The government defense market is best characterized as a
monopsony where the government is the only buyer of the
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products that several companies manufacture. Due to the high
barriers to entry, which include technology and cost of plant
equipment at the upper end of the prime contract market, the
number of contractors remains fairly constant.
Companies enter and compete in markets where they will be
able to continue as a going concern. Moreover, the assumption
"that firms seek maximum economic profits has a long history
in economic literature." (Nicholson, 1989, p. 352) When
defense spending increases, the amount of business that the
defense contractors receive in the monopsony should increase.
It was hypothesized that this increase in defense spending
improves the financial condition of these defense contractors.
This is the overall hypothesis of this thesis. The
hypothesized effect of other independent and control variables
are discussed as each is developed and analyzed.
C. THE SAMPLE
This section details the source and process used to select
the sample of DoD contractors for this thesis. In selecting
the sample, a representative and manageable number of
contractors was desired.
The primary source used for selecting the major DoD prime
contractors was the DIOR annual 100 Companies Receiving the
Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards. This report
ranks the major DoD contractors, with each contractor
subsidiary included, by order of dollar amount of DoD prime
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contracts awarded in a given fiscal year. Several facts and
statistics preface the ranking such as:
1. changes in the top 100 contractors from the previous
year,
2. cumulative percentages of total prime contract awards for
various rankings,
3. procurement categories,
4. and the top twelve contractors and their major products.
The method used in selecting the representative sample of
top defense contractors was to determine the twenty largest
defense prime contractors over the past twenty years based on
the DoD contract awards. This select group represents those
contractors receiving the highest dollar value of defense
contracts and could be classified as the top stratum in a
stratified sample.
Two companies out of the original twenty selected were
deleted leaving the sample with eighteen contractors. The
first company deleted was Hughes Aircraft since it was
acquired by General Motors in 1986 and therefore did not have
complete independent data for the period covered.
Tenneco, Inc., was the second company deleted from the
sample. It is a widely diversified conglomerate which has a
large investment in oil and gas pipelines. This investment
causes the Tenneco capital structure to be significantly
different from the other companies in the sample since it
holds more debt capital than other companies in the sample.
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This high reliance on debt capital caused the financial health
values determined from the Dagel and Pepper model to indicate
that Tenneco was in a "bankrupt" condition for the past
sixteen years. This was not the case, so Tenneco was dropped
from the sample population to prevent the negative indication
from affecting the sample. The final eighteen companies
selected and used for the sample are listed in Table 1. The
abbreviation for each company that is used in latter tables is
in parenthesis.
The cumulative percent of DoD sales from 1975 to 1990 for
the individual companies ranges from a low of 1.9 percent for
General Motors to a high of 86.5 percent for Grumman. The
percent of DoD sales was determined from the amount awarded in
a given fiscal year as stated in the DIOR annual top 100
contract award report divided by the selected contractor total
revenues for the year. 4
TABLE 1



















4This measure of DoD sales has some "noise" which will be





This section provides a discussion on the dependent
variable of contractor financial condition, how the financial
condition was determined, and which independent and control
variables were used in this study.
1. Dependent Variable
This study was designed to measure the dependent
variable of contractor financial health by using at least one
of the three financial distress models that were reviewed
earlier in section A. 3. of this chapter. The model by Zavgren
provided the best overall financial picture since it utilized
seven variables, each depicting a different dimension of
financial condition, to develop one number to characterize the
overall condition of each contractor. Although all the
companies utilized in constructing the Zavgren model were
American firms, they were widely diversified and not industry
specific. Since each industry of U.S. business normally
possesses specific financial characteristics, a model
developed on the industry of concern would provide a more
characteristic description of that industry.
In developing their model, Dagel and Pepper did not
utilize financial ratios that capture the entire range of
financial dimensions. This model is heavily weighted toward
the liquidity of a firm since four of the six variables relate
to the liquidity position of the firm. The major viability of
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this model is that it was developed as a predictor of
financial distress for defense industry contractors. In fact,
eleven of the eighteen contractors used in this thesis sample
were identical to contractors utilized in constructing the
Dagel and Pepper model. 5
The advantages and disadvantages of these two models
are so unique that both approaches were used to calculate
financial health for the contractors in this study. It was
felt that strong cases could be made for each model.
a. Zavgren Model




P(x) is the probability of financial distress for a firm. The
Zavgren model uses seven variables which are:
X\ = Inventory/Sales
Xi = Receivables/Inventory
X] = Cash/Total Assets
X
k
= Quick Assets/Current Liabilities
X\ = Total Income/Total Capital
Xh = Debt/Total Capital
X1 = Sales/Net Plant
For one year prior to failure, the coefficients were
determined to be:
5The Dagel and Pepper model utilized 29 bankrupt and 29
comparable non-bankrupt firms for their model. Ten non-
bankrupt were identical and one bankrupt firm was identical.
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3, = -0. 03074 P 5 =-0. 00486
p\ = 0.04350 p 7 =-0.001 10
The ratios in the Zavgren model were determined
based upon the COMPUSTAT data tapes. To determine the
specific data items used to construct each ratio, three
references were required which included: the 1985 Zavgren
article; the 1973 Pinches, et al., article; and the Industrial
COMPUSTAT Manual. The degree of depth that the COMPUSTAT data
base possesses was not able to be duplicated, but proxy
measures were used instead to approximate the data that a
COMPUSTAT data base would provide. Appendix I provides a
comparison of the COMPUSTAT definitions for specific data
items, the Dagel and Pepper definitions, and the measures
actually used in this study.
A common log transformation was applied to all
financial ratios for the Zavgren model. Although the Zavgren
article did not specifically state that this was performed,
the article was based on the two Pinches, et al . , articles
which did state "that a common log transformation was applied
to all financial ratios to improve normality, reduce outliers,
and improve homoscedas t i ci ty of the distributions." (Pinches,
et al., 1973, p. 390 and 1975, p. 296) It was assumed that
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Zavgren also performed this transformation on ratios prior to
developing her model. 6
Performing common log transformations on the
financial ratios caused a unique problem. The return on
investment (total income/total capital) and financial leverage
(debt/total capital) ratios were negative for some of the
contractors during certain years. Since a common log cannot
be taken of a negative number, a mathematical operation was
utilized to ensure the log operation could be performed on all
ratios. 7 This operation did cause a distortion in the data
by giving the negative number a larger effect than it
otherwise would have had, but it did provide the indication
that the firm has an unfavorable condition which was felt to
be more important.
6The Zavgren value for the financial health of a firm was
determined with and without the common log transformation.
With the common log transformation, there was more variability
and range for the sample measures (0.5046 to 0.5312) as
opposed to without the log transformation (0.5855 to 0.5982).
Both versions were correlated with the Dagel and Pepper data.
With the log transformation, the correlation was 0.703.
Without the log transformation, the correlation was 0.050.
Therefore, since the two models were designed to tell roughly
the same story about the financial condition of the given set
of firms, the correlation should have been relatively high
between outputs of the two models. The log transformed
financial ratios were thus used for the Zavgren model inputs.
This operation was as follows:
ROI = Return on Investment
RFAC = ROI/ABS(ROI) which would equal +1 if ROI > and equal
-1 if ROI < 0.
ROI2 = [log(ROI * RFAC)] * RFAC where the log operation is
always possible and a negative sign is assigned to ROI2 if ROI
< 0.
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Zavgren then developed units called nits to
describe the condition of the firms.* The equation used to




where In is the natural logarithm and p is the probability of
failure determined from equation (l). 9
b. Dagel and Pepper Model
The Dagel and Pepper financial distress model for
DoD contractors was developed from 29 bankrupt and 29
nonbankrupt publicly held firms using the mul
t
i-var iate
statistical procedure of discriminant analysis. The linear
equation which resulted from their study is:





















Working Capi tal /Total Assets
Net Sales/Total Assets
!The development of this measure is beyond the scope of
this paper. Briefly, nits are based on the Shannon Entropy
Theory which was developed to analyze information flow in a
network. The entropy is the degree of uncertainty over the
occurrence of an event. (Zavgren, 1985, p. 30,36-40)
9As would be expected, the correlation between p and h(l-
p) is very high (0.998); therefore either measure would
provide nearly identical results for further correlations or
regression models.
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A bankrupt firm would have Z < 0, and a nonbankrupt firm would
have Z > 0.
Dagel and Pepper suggested using the classification
scheme in Figure 9 after verifying and validating their model.
This figure adds the classifications of "weakly solvent" to
firms with Z-scores between zero and the nonbankrupt mean and
"potentially bankrupt" to all firms with Z-scores less than
the nonbankrupt mean. This was used to increase the
reliability of their model in classifying the financial
condition of each contractor. For this study, the only
relevant information from the Dagel and Pepper model is the









Source: Dagel and Pepper, 1989
Figure 9. Dagel and Pepper Classification Scheme
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2. Independent Variables
In selecting the independent variables to represent
DoD spending, several possible candidates emerged from the
literature review. These candidates included: (1) defense
budget authority, (2) defense budget outlays, (3) amount of
DoD prime contract awards, and (4) the sum of the procurement
and RDT&E account outlays. Also considered were each of these
four measures stated as a percentage of GNP and as a
percentage of national outlays. Two more possibilities were
the amount of DoD prime contract awards and the sum of the
procurement and RDT&E account outlays each as a percentage of
DoD out lays .
All the percentage measures were quickly eliminated as
they added the variability of the denominator into the
measure. This added variability of the denominator clouds the
analysis when attempting to isolate the effect DoD spending
has on the financial condition of these contractors.
Budget authority was not selected as the best measure
for two reasons. First, it does not represent the actual
amount spent during the year. Second, it includes extra
distortions since it also captures the variability of the O&M
and Military Personnel accounts. Although it represents the
actual amount spent, budget outlays also include the
distortions of the varying amounts of other DoD accounts that
do not impact on the defense contractors.
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The sum of the procurement and RDT&E accounts removed
the distortions of the variability of other DoD accounts that
existed in the DoD outlays and DoD authority measures. This
measure was selected for further analysis.
The amount of prime contracts awarded each year was
another measure that was selected for further analysis. There
are three reasons why this measure has merit although it does
have the distortion that some of the contract awards are not
earned or paid to the contractor for several years due to
multi-year features.
First, the contractors that were selected in the
sample have been defense contractors for years prior to and
throughout the entire period covered by this study. This
continuity tends to normalize the effect that multi-year
contracts have on the amount of DoD business. Second, it can
be argued that the financial condition of a firm is impacted
by the expected future demand for its products and hence its
future expected earnings potential. Since prime contracts are
viable for several years, contractor expected future earnings,
hence its market value and financial condition, may be more
accurately predicted. Finally, the amount of DoD prime
contracts awarded was divided by the total revenue of each
contractor to construct a measure of the percentage of
business of each contractor that was DoD related.
Along with the constant dollar amounts of the
procurement and RDT&E accounts and the prime contracts awarded
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each year, the yearly change of these measures was considered
a separate independent variable. The basis for this
determination was that as defense spending changes, the prime
contractors receive proportionately more of the change in
procurement or prime contract dollars.
The change in DoD spending level selected depended on
the independent measure of DoD spending selected. For
example, if the DoD spending measure selected was the amount
of DoD prime contracts awarded in a year, then the change in
DoD spending level measure selected was the change in DoD
prime contracts awarded from year to year.
3. Control Variables
Several control variables were analyzed to determine
their significance to this study on the financial condition of
defense contractors. The control variables reviewed include
GNP, change in GNP, inflation, prime rate, industry capacity
utilization, and the percent of DoD business for each
contractor (measured by dividing the amount of DoD prime
contracts by total revenue for each contractor) .
To provide a meaningful and useful model, a limited
number of control variables had to be selected.
Mul t i col 1 inear i ty also had to be considered to prevent
different control or independent variables from reflecting
nearly identical information. Several considerations that
bear on the choice of control variables are discussed next.
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Inflation can impact the financial condition of a
contractor depending on how much of the inflated prices the
contractor absorbs and how much is passed on to the buyer.
Also if fixed-price contracts are considered, the accuracy of
the inflation estimates and stated price adjustment clauses
affect the profitability of the contractor (DFAIR, 1985, p. V-
52) .
The prime interest rate can impact the financial
condition of a contractor by increasing interest expenses as
the prime interest rate rises. An increase in the prime
interest rate would then cause net profit to decline if
ceteris paribus is applied.
In the overall economic picture though, both the
inflation rate and the prime rate effects are reflected in the
GNP. To limit the number of control variables, it was assumed
that the GNP measure selected incorporated to some extent the
inflation and prime interest rate effects. Only one GNP
measure, either the constant dollar GNP or the change in GNP,
was needed for the model development. Later analysis showed
that constant dollar GNP was highly correlated to the defense
spending independent variables. Therefore, the change in GNP
was used to represent the effects of GNP on the dependent
var iabl e
.
The control variables of capacity utilization and
percent DoD business were also considered in the analysis.
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From the Greer and Liao study (1985), it was expected that as
capacity utilization rose, the financial condition of the
contractors would have also risen. Based on the GAO report
(1986) and the Morse and Kramer thesis (1985), it was
hypothesized that as percent DoD business increased for a
firm, the financial health of the firm would have improved;
but the more recent Treglia study (1991) places some doubt on
this hypothesis in the last half of the period between 1980
and 1990.
Further discussion and development on which
independent and control variables were selected for the
development of the model from those remaining is located in
Chapter IV.
4. Summary of Variables for Analysis
The following variables were selected for further
analysis and development of the model:
Dependent Variables :
Dagel and Pepper Z-scores
Zavgren nits values
Independent Variables :
Amount of DoD prime contracts awarded
Sum of procurement and RDT&E accounts
Change in DoD spending level
Control Variables :
GNP or change in GNP
Capacity utilization
Percent DoD business for each contractor
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E . DATA
In the ideal case, data would be standardized and
accurate. However, such data is often difficult, expensive,
or impossible to obtain. There will therefore be "noise" in
most sets of data. It is the analysts responsibility to
minimize the effects of the "noise".
In obtaining financial information on the sample companies
over the sixteen-year period, the primary source for the
company data was the yearly Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC) 1 OK filing and annual report for each company.
Secondary sources were used when the SEC 10K or annual report
was not available. The secondary sources utilized included
Moody's Industrial Manual, Moody's Public Utilities Manual,
Standard & Poor's Corporate Record, and the DIALOG computer
data base.
The SEC 1 OK reports are required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on a yearly basis by each company. Most
companies submit their annual report along with certain
supplementary information to fulfill the requirement. The
accounting and reporting practices of each contractor varies
slightly since the Financial Accounting Standards Board only
provides general guidelines for financial reporting. The
inconsistencies in accounting and reporting affect the
comparability of the data.
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Moody's Industrial Manual and Moody's Public Utilities
Manual compile much of the same information on companies that
is stated in annual reports, but in a condensed format. These
annually published manuals show financial information and bond
ratings for hundreds of companies across all segments of
indus try
.
The Standard & Poor's Corporate Record also provides
annual report summary data on hundreds of companies, but it
only covers the previous two years. This reference contains
a summary of the latest company annual report data.
All the company data was assimilated and standardized as
conditions warranted. The different presentations of the
financial data between the various references were reconciled.
Over the sixteen year period, companies varied their annual
report presentations which were also reconciled to maintain
continuity. One noted difference between the data set in this
study compared to the Zavgren data set is that the Zavgren
data set used COMPUSTAT data. This study attempted to
replicate, with as much accuracy as time allowed, the data in
COMPUSTAT
.
The company data items that were collected and organized
for this study are listed in Table 2. This format was
developed after reviewing the financial data organization
techniques used by Robert Morris Associates in its Annual
Statement Studies and the United States Bureau of the Census
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TABLE 2
COMPANY FINANCIAL DATA COLLECTED
Income Statement
Net Sales
Other Revenue (i.e. from major investments)
Other Income (net) (i.e. interest income)
Total Revenue
Cost of Goods Sold
Selling, General, and Administrative Expense
Other Expenses (i.e. research and development)
Total Expenses
Minority Interest
Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT)
Interest Expense













Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment
Depreciat ion



















Total Liability and Equity
(Items indented were summed from non-indented items.)
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in its Quarterly Financial Report. The data was stored in a
Microsoft Works data base for ease of manipulation and
handl ing
.
Prior to developing and collecting the list of required
data, the data used in the Dagel and Pepper study and the
Zavgren study was reviewed to enable the data collected for
this study to be as similar to the data in those studies as
time would permit. The calculated Dagel and Pepper Z-scores,
the Zavgren financial health measures, and the percent DoD
business for the contractors are shown in Appendix II.
The ability to replicate the Dagel and Pepper data was
much higher than the ability to replicate the COMPUSTAT data.
Therefore more reliability was placed in the data, the model,
and financial condition scores from the Dagel and Pepper
model .
The primary source of information for the U.S. Government
budgetary information was the Budget of The United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1992, Historical Tables (Budget) ,
which is developed by the Office of Management and Budget.
Other fiscal year Hi stori cal Tables by OMB and various volumes
of Stat i st i cal Abstracts of The United States (SAOUS) were
also used to extend certain data sets."
10 SAOUS uses the OMB Budget as its source for tables on
government spending.
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The Economic Indicators , a U.S. Government Printing Office
monthly publication, was used as the source for the economic
data on the change in GNP, prime rates, and inflation."
The capacity utilization rates for this study were
obtained from the monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin. The
capacity utilization rates used in the Greer and Liao study
(1986) were from the aerospace component industry group, which
is a subgroup of the durable goods category. Since the
aerospace component industry capacity utilization rates could
not be duplicated from the available sources, the durable
goods capacity utilization rates were used instead.
F. ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIPS
This section discusses the plan that was developed for
structuring the relationships to be tested between the
variables. The relationships were examined using the
statistical techniques of correlation and regression. The
following linear regression equation was used:
The OMB Budget, SAOUS, Economic Indicators , and Survey
of Current Bus iness , a U.S. Department of Commerce monthly
publication, are identical in information where they overlap
except GNP. The GNP numbers in the OMB Budget are the only
different figures from the other sources. The OMB GNP numbers
were utilized in the background discussion in Chapter I. The
change in GNP from the Economic Indicators was used in Figure









3 ; = independent variable coefficient
x
tj = independent variable
€, = error variable
K = number of independent variables
i = ith set of n sets of observations
In order to determine the impact that the independent
variable of defense spending has on the dependent variable of
financial condition, relationships were tested on two levels.
First, relationships between aggregate defense spending and
aggregate financial condition of the contractors were
examined. The objective here is to draw broad conclusions
about total defense spending and the overall financial health
of the defense contractor industrial sector.
The aggregate financial condition of the defense
contractors (FHJ was expected to improve as aggregate defense
spending (DS
A ) increased, due to the contractors receiving
higher business volume. This should be reflected in positive
beta coefficients for the independent variables of level of
defense spending (DSJ and the change of defense spending
(DELTA DS
A ) .
The defense contractors also have non-defense related
business; therefore, their financial health is also impacted
by the state of the overall economy. To account for this
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influence on the financial condition, the change in GNP (DELTA
GNP) was selected as a control variable. If the change in GNP
was positive, the financial condition was expected to improve.
This should be reflected by a positive beta coefficient for
the change in GNP. Other broad trends that occurred could be
accounted for by using the year (YEAR) as an independent
variable to remove the trend. These relationships are







, DELTA GNP, YEAR)
Second, relationships between the financial health of each
individual contractors and DoD spending specific to that
contractor were examined. The objective here is to draw
conclusions about the responsiveness of financial conditions
of specific firms to DoD spending directed toward the firms.
The financial condition of each individual contractor
(FHp) was expected to improve as each contractor increased its
amount of DoD business due to the higher business volume.
This should be reflected in positive beta coefficients for the
independent variables of individual contractor level of
defense prime contract awards (PCp) and the change of the
prime contract awards (DELTA PCp) .
Since the contractor competes in the defense industry, the
total amount of defense spending for the defense industry
(DSa) and the change in the amount of defense spending in the
defense industry (DELTA DS*) were additionally expected to
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impact the financial condition of the individual contractors.
This should be reflected in positive beta coefficients for the
aggregate measure of defense spending (DSJ and the change of
the aggregate defense spending level (DELTA DS
t ) .
Each contractor has non-defense related business. The
financial condition of the individual contractor is therefore
also impacted by the state of the overall economy. To account
for this influence on the financial condition of the
individual contractor, the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) was
selected as a control variable.
This analysis was conducted in two modes. First, broad
trends for each contractor were controlled for by using the
year (YEAR) as a trend remover. Second, broad trends for each
contractor were not removed by eliminating the year as an
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At the individual contractor level, one further question
analyzed was whether the sensitivity of the financial
condition of the contractor to DoD spending is related to
percent of DoD business for the contractor. If percent DoD
business is greater, the financial condition of the contractor
should be more sensitive to DoD spending. Therefore, the
greater sensitivity should be reflected in higher beta
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the change in DoD spending variables (DELTA PC
P ,
DELTA DS») .
The discussion of the actual results and analysis of these
relationships is in Chapter IV.
G. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES
The seventh step in this thesis entailed calculating and
analyzing data in three parts which included:
1. Providing descriptive information on the dependent,
independent, and control variables individually by use of
means, standard deviations, and ranges.
2. Providing a tabular portrayal of the relationships
between the variables using correlation techniques.
3. Developing a formal model of the relationships between
the dependent and independent variables by use of
regression techniques taking into consideration the
control variables.
This procedure and the results are provided in Chapter IV.
H. PROBLEMS/LIMITATIONS ENCOUNTERED IN STUDY
There is no absolute measure or standard in determining
the financial condition or health of a company. A number of
generally accepted techniques for determining the financial
condition of a company include common size analysis and Du
Pont analysis. In these methods, various ratios of a firm are
compared with industry standards to relate the condition of
each firm with that of the industry which the firm is
principally engaged. Although a majority of the firms studied
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are in the aerospace field, most of these companies are
diversified and have substantial income from operations
outside their principal business.
A number of studies have been conducted relating defense
business financial ratios to aggregate totals of durable goods
manufacturers or nonfinancial corporate businesses. Most of
these studies have centered around just defense contractor
profit. This study used an accepted failure prediction model
to enable the use of several financial ratios to produce one
"measure" of the financial condition for a company.
Several limitations that were encountered during this
study are discussed below. This list is not exhaustive, but
does include the major items that created "noise" in the
collected data. Ideally, no "noise" is desirable in a data
set. Research constraints of time and finances resulted in
these 1 imi tat ions
.
1 . Timing
A fundamental problem encountered when comparing
financial data from different sources is the "timing"
difference between the sources. In this study, the DIOR list
of top contractors is based on the fiscal year. The
government fiscal year is from 1 October to 30 September.'
l2The government changed its fiscal year from 1 August-31
July to 1 October-30 September in 1976. A three-month interim
fiscal period was used for budgetary measures during the
switch in fiscal years.
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Most contractors use fiscal years which coincide with the
calendar year. This creates a timing difference in relating
the prime contract awards and DoD spending to the financial
condition of a firm.
Another factor adding to the timing discrepancy is
that some of the contract awards are multi-year awards which
do not result in substantial revenue to the firm until two or
three years later. The multi-year awards allow for the
purchase of long lead items and major plant equipment. This
factor affects those contractors that build and deliver major
items which require long production periods such as ships,
missiles, satellites, and aircraft.
Some of the timing distortions are minimized when data
for the individual firms is aggregated. When individual firms
are analyzed separately, these distortions have more
unavoidable effects on the outcome. Most of the firms
considered in this thesis sample have had a constant annual
growth in the value of DoD contracts received. 13 This
constant growth in DoD contract awards reduces the multi-year
effect since these same contractors have been receiving
contracts prior to and continuously through the period covered
in this thesis sample.
nOne exception to this is Tenneco, Inc., which has been
more cyclical, but with an increasing trend, due to large
contract awards in the years that it received aircraft carrier
contracts .
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2. Procurement Policy Changes
From 1975 to 1990, the United States government made
several changes in its policy of making progress payments to
defense contractors. The rate at which the government made
progress payments has affected the amount of borrowing
required by the contractors. This in turn affected their
liquidity and profitability.
Another procurement policy shift during this period
was that DoD increased the use of fixed-price contracts. The
goal of this policy was to increase contractor efficiency,
control costs, and increase the amount of financial risk for
major defense contractors. As a result of this policy change,
several contractors experienced losses on fixed-price
contracts
.
These procurement policy changes demonstrate the risks
involved in competing in the defense industry which can affect
the financial condition of a firm. The limitation these
changes impose on this study is that changes in these policies
during this period were not isolated to determine their affect
on the financial condition of contractors.
3. Other Government Agency Contracts
Many government contractors list in their annual
reports or SEC 1 OK filings the amount or percentage of their
revenues that is based on government sales. This amount is
not broken down by specific government agency. The major
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government agency making purchases from the sample contractors
used in this thesis has been the DoD. Currently as the DoD
budget shrinks, more contractors are using their strengths and
resources to increase their potential for contracting with
other government agencies such as the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) . This was a limitation in that not all
the sample contractors listed percent government sales in
their annual reports, and the percent government sales that
were listed included other government agency procurement
act ions
.
Sales of military equipment to foreign governments is
conducted under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
Since DoD administers this program for the foreign customers,
many contractors include FMS under their government sales
totals. The foreign government end items are produced and
delivered from the same production lines building the DoD end
items. While FMS procurement is included in the annual
government sales figures of the sample contractors, it does
not reflect the DoD spending impact on the financial condition
of the contractors. Therefore, another problem in using the
government sales figures was that it added distortions which
could not be accounted for. 14
M Not all defense contractors state the amount or percent
of defense or government business in their annual reports.
Correlation tests were performed between the percent DoD
business based on DoD prime contract awards/total revenues and
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4. Accounting Changes
Over the period studied, a number of accounting
changes have occurred which have influenced the financial
statements of the individual contractors. Three major
accounting changes were Financial Accounting Standards (FAS)
Nos. 52, 94, and 96.
Financial Accounting Standard No. 52, Foreign Currency
Translations, required firms to change their treatment of
foreign operations with the foreign exchange translation
adjustments being accumulated as a separate component of
stockholder equity. Most of the firms in the sample adopted
this FAS in 1982. No special considerations were made to the
data to smooth the effects of this change.
In 1987, most companies adopted FAS No. 96, Accounting
for Income Taxes, which changed the method of computing income
taxes from the previously used "deferred method" to the
presently used "liability method". No special considerations
were made to the data to smooth the effects of this change.
Most companies which have financial service
subsidiaries adopted FAS No. 94, Consolidation of All
percent government sales (correlation = .746) and the amount
of DoD prime contract awards and amount of government sales
(correlation = .846). From the sample contractors, there were
198 of 288 (18 contractors by 16 years) that this correlation
check is based on which is 69 percent of the sample. Neither
pair of measures is without its disadvantages. The percent
DoD prime contract awards/total revenue was used since this
data was available for the entire period whereas the percent
government sales data was not always available.
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Majority-Owned Subsidiaries, in 1988. This FAS changed how
companies report subsidiaries, especially financial
subsidiaries. Before 1988, financial subsidiaries were
normally accounted for on an equity basis. The equity basis
method treats subsidiaries as an "investment" on the balance
sheet and "other income" on the income statement. The use of
the equity method was due to the financial operations of the
parent company being so different in nature and essentially
unrelated to the operations of the "other" subsidiaries. With
FAS No. 94, the financial subsidiaries were consolidated with
all other subsidiaries. All accounts of the subsidiaries were
thus added to each respective account on the financial
statements of the parent company. Adjustments to the company
data were made where possible to bring these financial
subsidiaries back on the equity basis for the last three
years
.
5. Tax Policy Changes
Several tax changes occurred from 1975 to 1990 which
affected the financial condition of companies. The most
notable changes occurred in the 1986 Tax Recovery Act.
Although the 1986 Tax Recovery Act did lower tax rates which
increased earnings, it also changed the treatment on revenue
recognition on long-term contracts. This essentially
decreased the amount of tax deferral allowed and hence had a
negative effect on cash flows. Two other provisions in the
62
1986 Tax Act increased the contractors tax liability by
eliminating the investment tax credit and decreasing
depreciation allowances. (Treglia, 1991, pp. 11-12) No
adjustments to the financial data were made to eliminate the
effects of these tax policy changes.
6. Mergers/Acquisitions/Joint Ventures
From 1975 to 1980, numerous mergers and acquisitions
were completed. Defense subsidiaries of one major defense
contractor tended to be sold to another major defense
contractor. No special treatment of the data was performed to
smooth the fluctuations caused by such complex business
combinations. 15 These actions were considered part of the
operating decisions of the firm.
The DIOR top 100 contractor report lists joint
ventures separately from the major company involved in the
enterprise. When this was the case, each company in the joint
venture was allocated an equal share of the joint contract
award it
15Two major mergers occurred during the period which were
RCA with General Electric and Hughes Aircraft with General
Motors .
uAn example of this is the joint venture between
McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics in making the Navy A-12
aircraft. In 1990, this joint venture alone was ranked
thirty-third in the top 100 with $555 million of contract




Cash management has changed greatly over the past
twenty years. These changes were due to the upward trend in
interest rates and the increased use of electronic funds
transfers. The increase in interest rates has pushed up the
opportunity cost of holding cash. Electronic funds transfers
have enabled managers to optimize cash transactions on a real-
time basis. (Brigham, 1991, p. 790)
The article by Zavgren stated several items that could
not be accounted for in that study. These same items could
not be accounted for in this study. "These include the
unmeasured qualities of assets, the creative ability of
management, random events and the decisions of regulators and
courts of law." (Zavgren, 1985, p. 22)
Three other commonly known problems that occur when
using financial ratios for analysis are the different
accounting conventions (i.e., LIFO or FIFO) and depreciation
methods (i.e., ACRS , straight-line, or sum-of-the-years
digits) each company uses, the effects that inflation has on
inventory and depreciation, 17 and the ability of management
to control the look of its financial statements by using
"window-dressing" techniques.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board encourages, but
does not require, companies to report inflation adjusted
statements as an addendum to their required statements.
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One other problem encountered in this study was the
different presentations of the same basic data from various
sources. In order to obtain the financial data of the
nineteen companies over the sixteen-year period, a number of
different sources had to be consulted. Although most of the
data lines in the sources were consistent, some of the sources
arranged the data in a slightly different manner. Care was
used in assembling the data to minimize these differences
where they existed.
8. Summary
The study of the financial condition of companies over
time is inherently difficult because of accounting variations
between companies, accounting changes over time, management
and technology changes over time, diversification of companies
into various industry segments, inflation effects on inventory
and depreciation, end-of-year window dressing techniques
applied to financial statements, variations in data reported
by financial information organizations, and tax policy
changes
.
The financial condition of DoD contractors is further
complicated by timing differences of reports, government
procurement policy changes over time, and treatment of non-DoD
government related work and Foreign Military Sales.
The accumulation of all these problems and limitations
affects this study and its findings by adding "noise" to the
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data and the results that can not be filtered out. The exact
impact of the "noise" can not be measured or known but is
assumed to be minimal.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This chapter explains the analysis that was performed on
the data and the process used in developing the model to
relate the effect that DoD spending has on the financial
condition of major defense contractors. A Minitab statistical
program for use on personal computers was utilized for the
statistical calculations.
A. FINANCIAL CONDITION INDEX SELECTION
After the financial data was collected on the nineteen
original contractors in the sample (including Tenneco, Inc.),
the ratios and financial condition of the contractors were
determined for both the Dagel and Pepper and the Zavgren
models. Comparison of the results with what was known to have
occurred with these contractors was then conducted as a logic
test of the outputs from the models.
First, the Tenneco results from the Dagel and Pepper model
showed that Tenneco had negative Z-scores for all sixteen
years. This would have classified Tenneco as "bankrupt" for
the entire period. As discussed earlier, Tenneco was
dismissed from the sample because of these results.
Overall, the Dagel and Pepper Z-scores seemed to reflect
what was known to be the financial condition for the remaining
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contractors. A litmus test of sorts was a check on LTV. LTV
was classified as bankrupt by the Dagel and Pepper model
during eleven of the sixteen years. LTV did have substantial
financial problems throughout the sixteen years and officially
declared bankruptcy on 17 July 1986.
The rest of the Dagel and Pepper Z-scores showed results
where certain contractors in some years were classified as
"bankrupt". Some of these "mi sclass i f icat ions" were
attributed to the model. The Dagel and Pepper model has
negative coefficients for the current assets/current liability
and working capital/total assets terms which caused the Z-
score to decrease as these terms increased. This is
contradictory to what is normally considered correct since
these ratios are normally high for healthy firms. Dagel and
Pepper explained this by stating "the key point is that the
discriminant model variables are not independent." (Dagel and
Pepper, 1989, p. 11) They go on to explain how "a high value
of X5 [working capital/total assets] would likely be offset by
a corresponding increase in the Z-score resulting from a low
value of X| [total debt/total assets]." (Dagel and Pepper,
1989. p. 12) Terms in braces were added for clarification.
These negative coefficients are the cause for Grumman
having negative Z-scores in several years. Grumman decreased
current liabilities and increased current assets which
resulted in negative Z-scores during some years. Recently,
Grumman has not been receiving the major contracts it has had
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in the past such as the F-14 and A-6 contracts. Since Grumman
has high revenue earnings from DoD business, it would be
expected to be one of the first contractors to show a weakened
financial condition in a period of decreasing defense
spending
.
It is important to note one other contractor, Textron.
Textron showed negative Z-scores or low positive Z-scores from
1985 to 1990. Although Textron had not been in the same poor
financial condition as LTV, these low scores can be explained
by the purchase of AVCO by Textron in 1985 and the tripling of
its debt to finance the purchase.
The significant point here is that although the Dagel and
Pepper model may not have actually classified the contractors
correctly as far as "bankrupt" or "nonbankrupt " , the model has
provided a set of data on the financial condition of the
sample which has good variability. The variability is
consistent with known "good" and "bad" conditions for the
contractors
.
All the financial health measures from the Zavgren model
are close to 0.5 on the model scale of zero to one. Companies
in poor financial condition should have Zavgren financial
health measures close to zero. LTV, although bankrupt, had
financial health measures higher than actual healthier
contractors. There are two possible reasons for the Zavgren
model results not being able to pass the reality checks.
First, the data used in calculating the Zavgren model scores
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may not have been close enough to duplicate the COMPUSTAT data
that the model is based on. Second, some of the ratios can
provide misleading signals. For example, LTV in 1986 had a
net loss and a negative total equity. This resulted in a high
positive return on investment (total income/total capital) for
LTV for that year when in fact its return on investment was
exceedingly poor.
Since the Zavgren model did not provide any meaningful or
explainable variability, this model was no longer considered
in the analysis. Attention was instead directed to financial
condition as measured by the Dagel and Pepper model.
Aggregate yearly Dagel and Pepper Z-scores were
constructed by first calculating the yearly Z-scores for each
of the eighteen contractors in the sample. The mean of the
eighteen Z-scores for each year was then determined for each
of the sixteen years. This mean reflected the average
financial condition for the sample.
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The research hypothesis (H;) states that as DoD spending
increased, the financial health of the defense contractors
should have improved. The null hypothesis {H
a ) is then stated
such that as DoD spending increased, there should have been no
systematic change in the financial health of the defense
contractors. To test this null hypothesis for population
correlation, Newbold states:
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It can be shown that when this null hypothesis is true and
the random variables have a joint normal distribution, the
random variable corresponding to t follows a Student's t
distribution with (n-2) degrees of freedom. (Newbold,
1988, pp. 440-441)














n = sample size (16 years for this analysis)
1 = sample correlation coefficient
p population correlation coefficient
The sample correlation ( r) between the aggregate yearly
Dagel and Pepper Z-scores of the sample contractors and the
amount of top prime contracts awarded was -0.29. This
resulted in a random variable t = -1.13. Therefore the null
hypothesis {H ) cannot be rejected for the upper one-sided
test. When the sum of the procurement and RDT&E accounts was
correlated with the Dagel and Pepper Z-scores, the sample
correlation factor ( r) of -0.687 was found. These correlation
results are opposite of what was expected since they state
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Figure 10. Dagel and Pepper Aggregate Z-Scores
A plot of the aggregate Z-scores versus time is shown in
Figure 10. This figure shows that although there are peaks
over the years, the general trend is downward. 18 Attempting
to explain this overall trend, the general decline in the
financial health of the contractors could be attributed to a
number of items such as the shift to more fixed-price
contracts by DoD in the 1980's or increased competition among
the contractors themselves in the face of declining defense
dollars in the late 1980's.
18This trend is consistent with the findings of the
Treglia study (1991) from 1984 to 1989.
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The problem posed by this declining financial health trend
had to be confronted. A statistical technique for removing
the general trend from the data was needed. It was decided
that the general trend could be removed by adding a variable
reflecting time to the analysis. The technique used was to
add the year as an independent variable in a multiple




Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics developed for the
dependent, independent, and control variables. The dependent
variables are the Z-scores calculated from the Dagel and
Pepper model and cover the entire sixteen-year period. All
dollar amounts for independent and control variables are
stated in terms of constant 1982 dollars.
A percent of DoD business greater than 100 percent
resulted for three contractors during certain years. This was
due to the contractor receiving more DoD contracts than their
total revenue for that year. Causes of this situation can be
attributed to timing differences and the multi-year contract
awards which were addressed in Chapter III Section H. Over
the entire period, this is smoothed by the use of averaged
data. Three companies have lower percentages of DoD business
than were expected based on comparisons with the reported




DEPENDENT (Z-SCORE) MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Aggregate 1 .967 0.649 0.844 2.871 |
Boe ing 3.088 1 .744 -0.842 5.075
General Dynamics 1 . 186 1 .403 -1 .585 3. 192
1
General Electric 2.791 0.625 1 .737 3.397
General Motors 3.014 1 .560 0.012 5. 167
Grumman 0.610 1 .356 -2.394 2.784
Honeywe 1
1
2.253 0.479 1 .052 2.782
IBM 4.303 1 .850 2.01 1 7.471
Litton 1 .770 1.272 0.444 3.725
Lockheed 2. 143 1 .604 0.071 5.373
LTV -2.726 3.734 -9.537 0.819 I
Martin Marietta 1 .769 1 .360 -1 .473 3.408 I
McDonnell Douglas 0.783 1 . 125 -1.282 2.641 I
Northrop 3.631 0.938 2. 184 5. 103
Raytheon 3.819 0.739 2.281 4.863
Rockwell Inter 3. 122 0.833 1 .079 4.527
Textron 0.646 0.973 -1 .216 1 .993
United Tech 1 .218 0.661 -0.018 2.865
Wes t inghouse 1 .986 0.478 0.706 2.524 |
INDEPENDENT
DOD PRI CON 82$ 105.86 21 .06 72.00 137. 10
PRO+RDT 82$ 70.65 23.35 44. 10 101 .80
DELTA DOD PC (%) 2.89 6.98 -8.5 12.7
DELTA PRO+RDT (%) 4.62 6.82 -6.2 16.6
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
I STATISTICAL DATA DESCRIPTION
1 CONTROL MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
GNP 82$ 3415. 455. 2695. 4157.
DELTA GNP (%) 2.70 2.48 -2.5 6.8
CAP UTIL (%) 77.60 5.34 63.9 85.4
%DOD BUSINESS
Aggregate 34.01 4.90 28. 12
"
41 .59
Boe ing 28.88 10.54 8.21 44.08
General Dynamics 78.06 19.75 47.27 129.59
General Electric 13.27 4.35 8.58 22.34
General Motors 1 .88 1 .43 0.66 4.93
Grumman 86.45 12.39 65.38 103.49
Honeywel
1
21 . 10 7.54 12.72 38.21
IBM 2.61 0.71 1 .57 3 .56
Li t ton 33.58 1 1 .67 15.36 52.99
Lockheed 49.93 10.27 33.91 63.89
LTV 13.32 7.25 5.60 29.33
Mart in Mar i et ta 47. 12 16.89 20.50 72.04
9 McDonnell Douglas 63.31 11 .22 42.94 79.53
Northrop 39.81 29.98 9.19 117.01
Raytheon 41 .69 7.81 30.31 55.44
Rockwe 1 1 Inter 27.97 17.98 1 1 .07 66.72 I
Textron 24.08 9.54 14.05 47.53
United Tech 25.35 6.52 13.32 38.30 I
Westinghouse 13.84 4.55 5.3 6 19.40
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reference. The companies were Northrop, Lockheed, and Martin
Marietta. There is no known reason for the disparity.
D. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
This section describes the correlation analysis between
the dependent, independent, and control variables. This
analysis was required to eliminate some of the independent and
control variables from the model to prevent mul
t
icol 1 inear i ty
.
This step was required prior to the regression model
development because as Newbold states:
The art of model building is to recognize the
impossibility of accounting for the myriad individual
influences on a variable of interest and to try, rather,
to pick out the most influential factors. Next it is
necessary to formulate a model to depict the interaction
of these factors. The goal is to achieve a model that is
sufficiently simple to allow convenient interpretation but
not so oversimplified that important influences are
ignored. (Newbold, 1988, p. 544)
Table 4 shows the results of the correlation analysis.
The correlation values shown are from the Pearson product
moment correlation coefficient. The Spearman rank correlation
of the data was also conducted with very similar results.
1. Analysis Between Dependent and Independent Variables
The correlation data between the aggregate financial
health of the contractors (AGGRE DPZ) and the independent and
control variables show interesting results. There is a high
negative correlation between the aggregate Z-score (AGGRE DPZ)
and the year (YEAR). This was expected because of the falling





AGGRJB DPZ YEAR DOD PR I CON
INDEPENDENT
1 YEAR -0.714
I DOD PR I CON -0.290 0.785
PRO+RDT -0.687 0.960 0.799
I DELTA DOD PC 0.588 -0.514 -0. 149
I DELTA PRO+RDT 0.317 0.214 0.241
CONTROL
GNP -0.731 0.979 0.686
DELTA GNP 0.388 0.068 0.113
CAP UTIL -0.026 0.046 -0.310
AGGREG %DOD 0.388 0. 106 0.623
PRO+RDT DELTA DOD PC DELTA PRO+RDT 1
DELTA DOD PC -0.597
DELTA PRO+RDT 0. 174 0.241
GNP 0.941 -0.573 0.098
DELTA GNP 0.121 -0. 180 0.033
CAP UTIL 0.042 -0.325 -0.361
AGGREG %DOD 0.200 0.288 0.664
GNP DELTA GNP CAP UTIL
DELTA GNP 0. 140
1 CAP UTIL 0.242 0.560
AGGREG %DOD -0.028 0.228 -0.472
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defense spending variables (DOD PRI CON and PRO+RDT) was
discussed in Section B of this chapter. Since both defense
spending variables and the year have negative correlations
with the aggregate Z-score, inclusion of the year variable in
the regression model may allow the trend to be "washed away".
The correlations between variables reflecting the
change in the defense spending variables (DELTA DOD PC and
DELTA PRO+RDT) and the aggregate Z-score are positive, which
was expected. As defense spending changed, it was expected
that contractors would obtain a share of the increased or
decreased defense contract dollars; hence their financial
condition would be expected to improve with increases in
defense spending and deteriorate with decreases.
The GNP (GNP) shows a high negative correlation with
the aggregate Z-score while the change in GNP variable (DELTA
GNP) shows a positive correlation with the aggregate Z-score.
A positive correlation was expected since an increase in GNP
is expected to improve the financial condition of the
contractors
.
The capacity utilization variable (CAP UTIL) has a low
negative correlation with the aggregate Z-score. This was
unexpected since the results of Greer and Liao (1986) showed
a high positive correlation between the capacity utilization
and contractor profitability. In a competitive market
situation, contractors can normally demand and receive higher
prices for their goods as capacity utilization increases.
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The aggregate percent DoD business (AGGREG %DOD) shows
a low positive correlation with the aggregate Z-score. This
indicates that as the percent of DoD business increased,
financial condition improved. This result is consistent with
the 1986 GAO report findings and the Morse and Kramer thesis
(1985), but it is inconsistent with the Treglia study (1991).
Since the correlation found in this study is only 0.388, it
does not provide a strong enough case that a positive
relationship exists for any definitive conclusion to be drawn.
2. Analysis Between Independent Variables
The correlations among the independent and control
variables were used for selecting which variables to use in
the regression model. An extremely high correlation between
two (or more) independent variables in a regression model can
result in the regression coefficients being unreliable.
The defense spending variables (DOD PRI CON and
PRO+RDT) are highly correlated with the year (YEAR) and GNP
(GNP) variables. Also, GNP is highly correlated with the
year. A problem with mul
t
icol 1 ineari ty could exist if all
these variables were used in the same regression model. To
limit the effects of mul t i col 1 ineari ty , the change in GNP
(DELTA GNP) was selected over GNP (GNP) for use in the
regression model as the control variable representing for
"other" economic influences. The high correlation between the
year (YEAR) and defense spending variables (DOD PRI CON and
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PRO+RDT) still exists and will influence the regression model.
The impact this has on the model can be assessed by using the
significance of individual variables in the regression
analysis . I9
Capacity utilization (CAP UTIL) was not selected for
the regression model so as to limit the number of variables in
the model. There is a positive relationship between capacity
utilization and the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) . This was
expected since capacity utilization is higher during periods
of higher GNP. The change in GNP variable accounts for some
of the effects of the capacity utilization.
The aggregate percent of DoD business variable (AGGREG
%DOD) has strong positive correlations with the aggregate DoD
prime contracts variable (DOD PRI CON) and the change in
procurement and RDT&E variable (DELTA PRO+RDT). This was
expected since an increase in DoD spending is expected to
increase the percent of DoD business for the contractors. To
minimize the mul
t
icol 1 inear i ty and the number of variables,
the aggregate percent DoD business was not selected for the
regression model. Percent of DoD business for each individual
contractor was used instead in the analysis after the
regression model was developed.
A clear indication of the likely presence of
mul
t
icol 1 inear i ty occurs when, taken as a group, a set of
independent variables appears to exert considerable influence
on the dependent variable, but when looked at separately,
through tests of hypotheses, all appear individually to be
insignificant." (Newbold, 1988, pp. 570-571)
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Two sets of four variables were chosen for the
regression model as a result of this correlation analysis.
The first set includes the year (YEAR), the aggregate DoD
prime contracts (DOD PRI CON) , the change in the aggregate DoD
prime contracts (DELTA DOD PC), and the change in GNP (DELTA
GNP) . The second set includes the year (YEAR), the
procurement and RDT&E outlays (PRO+RDT), the change in the
procurement and RDT&E outlays (DELTA PRO+RDT), and the change
in GNP (DELTA GNP). The only concern of possible
mul t i col 1 inear i ty with these two sets is between the year and
the defense spending variables (DOD PRI CON and PRO+RDT). By
checking the individual variable significance in the
regression equation, the existence of mul t
i




The correlation data and analysis from the previous
section were used in selecting the best measures to
incorporate in the regression models. This section details
the models that resulted.
Four variables were chosen to develop the regression
model. First, the year variable was selected to remove the
negative trend in the financial condition of the contractors.
The second and third variables were selected together as a
pair. Analysis were performed with two pairs, which were DoD
prime contract awards coupled with the change in DoD prime
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contract awards and the sum of procurement and RDT&E outlays
coupled with its change variable. The final variable chosen
was the change in GNP to control for all the "other" economic
factors that affected the financial health of the contractors.
The results of the multiple regressions using the Z-score as
the dependent variable are listed in Table 5.
TABLE 5
REGRESSION MODELS
Using the prime contract awards and its yearly
change, the coefficients are:







277 -0. 139 0.0153 0.0201 0.115
STD DEV 59. 14 0.030 0.006 0.013 0.028
SIGNI (p) 0.000 0.000 0.025 0. 151 0.002 1
F=21.18 p=0.000 R 2=88.5% ADJ R 2=84 . 3% DW=1 . 92
d
L
=0.53 dipl.66 at 1%
Using the Procurement and RDT&E outlays and its
j
change, the coefficients are:




195 -0.097 -0.004 0.044 0. 115
STD DEV 80.06 0.040 0.008 0.008 0.022
SIGNI (p) 0.033 0.036 0.651 0.000 0.000
|f=35.11 p=0.000 R 2=92.7% ADJ R 2=90 . 1% DW=2 . 70
H dz=0.53 df=\ .66 at 1%
Table 5 shows that the signs of the variable coefficients
are as expected in the regression using the prime contract
award measures as the independent variable. The coefficient
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for year (YEAR) is negative; for prime contract awards (DOD
PRI CON), the coefficient is positive; for the change in prime
contract awards (DELTA DOD PC), the coefficient is positive,
and for the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) , the coefficient is
positive. The Durbin-Wat son statistic shows no
autocorrelation in the errors at a test of one percent
significance. 20 All the variable coefficients are significant
(SIGNI) at 0.151 or better which leads to the conclusion that
mul
t
icol 1 inear i ty is not a major factor in this model.
The regression data in Table 5 using the procurement and
RDT&E outlays (PRO+RDT) as the independent variable shows that
the sign of the procurement and RDT&E outlays is negative,
which had not been expected. All other coefficient signs are
as expected. The Durbin-Watson statistic again shows no
autocorrelation in the errors at one percent significance.
The significance of the procurement and RDT&E outlays variable
(PRO+RDT) is low at 0.651, which indicates possible
mul t i col 1 inear i ty in this model.
20 In the least squares regression model, it is assumed
that the error terms are not correlated with one another. It
is important when using time series data regressions to test
if the error terms are correlated. If the error terms are
correlated, the problem is called autocorre lated errors. To
test for autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson test is performed.
Basically, if the calculated Durbin-Watson statistic ( d) is
greater than the tabulated value of c/,, the hypothesis that no
autocorrelation in the errors is accepted. (Newbold, 1988,
pp. 581-588)
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These results lead to more confidence being placed in the
model developed from the prime contract awards. This model
allowed the year variable to wash out the negative trend.
This model was chosen for further analysis examining
relationships between the financial condition of the
individual contractors and defense spending.
F. CONTRACTOR HEALTH AND FIRM-SPECIFIC DEFENSE SPENDING
The final analysis performed was to relate the financial
condition of the individual contractors with the amount of
firm-specific defense spending. This analysis was conducted
by constructing regression models for each firm both with and
without using the year variable (YEAR) to remove the general
trend. The use of the year variable was justified in the
aggregate case. However, when considering the contractors on
an individual level, a general trend may not be apparent since
each contractor is diversified and makes independent business
deci s ions
.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the regression
analysis. The individual contractor Z-score (dependent) was
regressed on five variables other than the year. These other
variables included: 1) the yearly prime contracts (constant
dollars) awarded by DoD to the contractor (PC), to reflect the
direct impact of DoD spending on the contractor; 2) the change
in prime contracts awarded by DoD to the contractor (DELTA
PC), to reflect the impact of the change of DoD contracts on
84
TABLE 6
INDIVIDUAL OOKTRACTOR REGRESSIM COEPPICIENTS (1ITH0UT TREXD REMOVAL)






flOE 6.210 -0.744 -0.00385 -0.01520 -0.0278 0.3072 22.7 29
P 0.018 0.501 0.906 0.707 0.704 0.136
GD 2.110 0.767 -0.01990 -0.05280 0.1996 0.1521 14.2 78
P 0.339 0.312 0.192 0.314 0.034 0.366
[ge 2.260 -0.858 0.02790 0.03640 -0.0229 -0.0028 88.1 13
P 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.189 0.907
1 61 6.420 -0.944 0.01231 -0.02610 -0.0313 0.2850 82.6 2
P 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.034 0.438 0.002
GRU -0.079 0.791 0.00430 -0.01950 0.0345 0.3365 13.2 86
P 0.976 0.673 0.863 0.435 0.595 0.063
SON 3.090 -0.042 0.01070 -0.00900 0.0018 0.0373 5.3 21
tr 0.004 0.968 0.260 0.601 0.944 0.473
IBM 13.000 3.509 -0.01410 -0.11940 0.1249 0.0510 68.0 3
P 0.000 0.186 0.289 0.017 0.018 0.670
LIT 0.595 0.119 -0.00330 0.00814 0.0997 -0.0516 0.0 34
p 0.807 0.922 0.760 0.634 0.117 0.749
1
Ul -5.780 0.883 -0.02590 0.03950 0.0541 0.2181 84.7 50
c 0.000 0.037 0.087 0.007 0.110 0.013
I LTV 6.370 4.516 -0.00480 -0.13130 0.3768 -0.0504 62.4 13
L p 0.110 0.204 0.792 0.025 0.002 0.856
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TABU 6 (CONTINUED)
INDIVIDUAL O0NTHACTO8 RECESSION COEFFICIENTS (IIT80UT TREND REMOVAL)
I






1 HAN 3.090 0.390 0.00790 -0.02360 -0.0469 0.1822 0.0 47
o 0.337 0.737 0.798 0.621 0.722 0.317
IO -3.850 -0.711 0.00860 0.07370 0.0351 0.2344 66.5 63
P 0.002 0.016 0.401 0.002 0.239 0.011
NOR -1.040 1.565 -0.00740 0.02440 0.0318 0.1528 54.2 40
P 0.548 0.060 0.252 0.060 0.316 0.122
RAY 2.090 -1.733 0.02790 0.05500 -0.0415 0.0538 71.3 42
P 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.126 0.239
ROC -0.480 -0.070 0.00850 0.03120 0.0203 0.1281 70.9 28
L 0.543 0.572 0.028 0.004 0.296 0.049
TEX 3.880 -1.230 0.00090 -0.02330 0.0220 0.1396 78.3 24
p 0.000 0.036 0.867 0.005 0.490 0.018
UT 2.390 -0.733 -0.00460 0.00720 0.0723 0.0792 31.3 25
P 0.032 0.068 0.703 0.437 0.030 0.251
IES 0.230 -0.838 0.00240 0.02520 0.0101 0.0684 16.4 14
p 0.760 0.312 0.715 0.114 0.574 0.178













INDIVIDOAL OONTOAOOR RBGRESSIOH OOEFFICIENTS (WITH TOD REDVAL)






m -393 0.2035 0.1400 -0.01520 -0.0776 0.0138 0.2878 18.5 29
P 0.511 0.505 0.935 0.687 0.451 0.887 0.177
1
GD 804 -0.4081 0.6197 -0.01430 0.0242 0.0597 0.0510 71.2 78
P 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.120 0.487 0.315 0.607
|_GE 8.53 -0.0032 -0.8498 0.02770 0.0366 -0.0229 -0.0031 86.8 13
1 p 0.890 0.919 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.213 0.904
GH 529 -0.2656 -0.4070 0.00480 0.0091 -0.0438 0.2592 91.0 L
P 0.010 0.011 0.123 0.206 0.512 0.153 0.000
GRU 437 -0.2220 0.8550 -0.00140 0.0163 -0.0246 0.2780 24.0 86
P 0.154 0.154 0.628 0.952 0.624 0.733 0.106
m -250 0.1285 -0.4483 0.01710 -0.0243 0.0227 0.0546 47.7 21
p 0.015 0.015 0.573 0.037 0.104 0.206 0.181
IBH 645 -0.3219 2.0520 -0.00760 -0.0427 0.0238 0.0156 87.7 3
P 0.002 0.003 0.224 0,367 0.212 0.533 0.835
LIT 409 -0.2070 -0.6830 0.00255 0.0436 0.0227 -0.0538 0.0 34
P 0.268 0.269 0.624 0.827 0.234 0.799 0.735
LOC -282 0.1401 1.3340 -0.03530 0.0058 0.1069 0.2146 86.6 50
P 0.149 0.157 0.016 0.034 0.817 0.041 0.012
LTV 1265 -0.6412 1.0650 0.00410 0.0173 0.1759 -0.0366 77.7 13




INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTOR REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (lITfl TREND REMOVAL) |




1 MAM -880 0.4468 -1.8760 0.02040 -0.0110 -0.0729 0.2007 0.0 47 I
p 0.149 0.148 0.318 0.502 0.808 0.560 0.246
O 295 -0.1516 -0.3154 0.00050 0.07370 0.0135 0.1895 67.6 63
P 0.283 0.278 0.472 0.968 0.002 0.696 0.049
NOR 180 -0.0917 1.1740 -0.00540 0.0349 0.0141 0.1571 55.1 40
P 0.304 0.302 0.183 0.410 0.044 0.686 0.114
1
M 293 -0.1476 -0.6987 0.01790 0.0504 -0.0291 0.0390 75.4 42
p 0.135 0.137 0.358 0.097 0.000 0.260 0.364
I ROC 99 -0.0506 -0.1299 0.00890 0.0427 0.0074 0.1327 69.8 28
r p 0.448 0.446 0.387 0.028 0.031 0.771 0.049
TEX 90 -0,0438 -1.2600 0.00110 -0.0159 0.0082 0.1319 77.5 24
P 0.420 0.440 0.038 0.839 0.190 0.822 0.020
UT -113 0.0584 -0.6371 -0.00670 -0.0041 0.0878 0.0975 29.4 25
P 0.424 0.415 0.128 0.598 0.804 0.030 0.193
IBS 210 -0.1066 0.2316 -0.00200 0.0248 -0.0148 0.0384 28.1 14
p 0.139 0.139 0.819 0.763 0.098 0.523 0.440














the contractor; 3) the constant dollar total prime contracts
awarded by DoD to all contractors (DOD PRI CON), to reflect
the impact of DoD spending on the defense industry as a whole;
4) the change in total prime contracts awarded by DoD to all
contractors (DELTA DOD PC), to reflect the impact of the
change in DoD spending on the defense industry as a whole; and
5) the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) , to account for all the
outside economic factors. The coefficients for each variable
and the significance (p) of the variable is listed.
The tables contain 36 regression models, two for each of
the 18 firms. Thus they contain 36 separate tests of the
influence of each variable on financial health. In evaluating
the influence of individual variables, two things are
important to observe: the signs of the coefficients and their
significance. A liberal p = 0.20 level of significance was
adopted as threshold. Several observations are worth noting.
For firm-specific prime contracts (PC) and the change in
firm-specific prime contracts (DELTA PC), most coefficients
are insignificant. When significant, positive signs (n = 14)
and negative signs (n = 14) are equally common. Thus there is
no indication of a relationship between financial health and
firm-specific defense spending.
For aggregate DoD prime contracts (DOD PRI CON) and the
change in aggregate DoD prime contracts (DELTA DOD PC), a
larger number of coefficients are significant; and positive
significant coefficients (n = 23) outnumber negative ones (n
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= 8) about three to one. This provides some weak indication
that firm-specific financial health is related to aggregate
DoD spending as hypothesized.
Most interestingly, the majority of coefficients (n = 19)
for the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) are positive and significant
(and there are no significant negative coefficients). Thus
the strongest evidence is consistent with economy wide
economic conditions influencing financial health more
consistently than DoD spending variables.
The regression models also give indications of the
collective ability of the variables to explain financial
health at the firm level. Tables 6 and 7 show the regression
equation adjusted R values. The adjusted R 2 values provide
an indication as to how well the regression models were able
to account for the change in the dependent variables of
financial condition. The adjusted R 2 data also shows that the
financial health of several contractors is poorly explained by
the regression performed. A possible reason for this could be
that the financial condition of these contractors is more
dependent on how the company is operated and the types of
management decisions that are made. In short, there are other
factors not included in the models that dominate the factors
that are included.
It was hypothesized that the greater the percent of DoD
business, the more sensitive the contractor would be to
defense spending. This greater sensitivity should be
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reflected by a higher beta. To test this, the percent of DoD
business was correlated with the beta coefficients from the
regression. The percent of DoD business for the individual
contractors was determined by averaging the yearly values for
each contractor over the sixteen years. The correlation was
run twice for each variable. The first run (COR1) included
the beta coefficients for all eighteen companies, the full
sample. Prior to the second run (COR2) , variables with
significance lower than 0.200 were eliminated from the data
set, creating a reduced data set. This second correlation was
performed to determine if the companies whose performance was
not explained by the model affected the results of the first
run. The number under the COR2 value is the number of
observations that were used in the second reduced sample set.
The lower the absolute value of the correlation, the less
significant is the correlation result.
Several patterns are worth noting. First, most of the
correlations in the full sample (COR1) test are small. This
suggests that relying on the reduced sample test may provide
better insights. But in fact, the sample size in the COR2
tests is quite small, so the results are tentative at best.
Second, there is a high negative correlation between the
change in prime contracts for the individual contractor (DELTA
PC) and the percent of DoD business for the contractor (%DOD)
in both tables. This is surprising. The hypothesis was that
greater percentage of DoD business would be associated with
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greater positive association between firm-specific DoD
spending and financial health.
Third, there does seem to be the expected positive
relationship between the sensitivity of firm financial
condition to aggregate DoD spending (DOD PRI CON) and the
percentage of DoD business (%DOD)
.
Fourth, the positive correlation between percent DoD
business (%DOD) and the change in GNP (DELTA GNP) is not as
one might hypothesize. As percent of DoD business increases,
one might expect less sensitivity of financial health to
general economic conditions (a negative correlation), not
more .
The correlation analysis between the coefficients and
percent of DoD business does not lead to any convincing
conclusions. Although some of the correlation values
increased once the less significant coefficients were removed,
the remaining number of observations was too small to draw any
general conclusions for the population.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study started by attempting to relate the overall
financial condition of defense contractors with the amount of
dollars the government spends on defense. A seven step
process to analyze this relationship was developed. The
process began with a detailed literature review and was
followed by a statement of the research hypothesis. Next, a
sample of eighteen defense contractors was selected. The
dependent, independent, and control variables were then
developed. After collecting the required data, relationships
between contractor financial condition and defense spending
was analyzed and tests were structured to examine hypothesized
associations. Finally, the financial condition of the
selected contractors was analyzed to detect any significant
relationships with the defense spending measures.
The findings of this study include:
1. The selected defense contractors have experienced a
decreasing trend in their financial health over the past
sixteen years. Whether this decreasing financial health
trend is due solely to their defense-related business is
doubtful. In the last two years of the study, some of
the decreasing trend can be attributed to the overall
declining economy.
2. After removing the declining financial condition trend,
a positive relationship exists between the amount of DoD
contracts awarded and the financial condition of the
group of defense contractors in the aggregate.
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3. There appears to be no consistent relationship between
the financial condition of the individual contractors and
the amount of DoD prime contracts awarded.
4. The amount of DoD business has a positive association
with financial health at the level of the aggregate
defense industry. However, at the individual contractor
level, no conclusion can be drawn as small sample size
prohibited significant conclusions.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these findings are
that as the amount of DoD contract awards decreases, the
financial condition of the defense industry as a whole will
probably continue to decline. Which contractors individually
will do worse and which will perform better financially is not
predictable on the basis of the amount of DoD spending. The
financial condition of the defense contractors will probably
depend less on the amount of DoD prime contracts or defense




This appendix lists the terms used in the equations for the
Dagel and Pepper Z-score model and the Zavgren logit model,
which used the COMPUSTAT data. The definitions, as they were
described by the respective model, are stated along with what
was used in this study to approximate their data. The terms
in the "THIS STUDY" column can be referenced to Table 2 in
relation to how they were determined from the balance and
income statements.
TERM REFERENCE DEFINITION THIS STUDY
1 Cash COMPUSTAT - This item
represents any
immediately negotiable
medium of exchange. It
includes money and any
instruments normally
accepted by banks for
deposit and immediate










Secur i t i es








Current Assets Dagel and Pepper - cash
and those assets which
in the normal course of
business will be turned
into cash within a year
from the date of the





| Liabi 1 i t i es
Dagel and Pepper - all
debts that fall due
within the coming year.
Current
Liabi 1 i t i es
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| Current
I Liabi 1 i t i es
COMPUSTAT - this item
represents the total
amount of short-term
notes and the current
portion of long-term




Liabi 1 i t i es
Inventory COMPUSTAT - five types
of inventory are listed
in this reference. This
definition is for total
inventory - this item
represents merchandise
bought for resale and
materials and supplies
purchased for use in
production of revenue.








COMPUSTAT - this item
represents debt
obligations due more
than one year from the
company's balance sheet




1 iabi 1 i t i es
Net Plant COMPUSTAT - has ten
choices of which two of
the most probable used
in the Zavgren study are
property, plant, and














goods and allowances for
reduction of prices.
Net sales
| Quick Assets Dagel and Pepper - the
sum of cash, marketable









IQuick Assets COMPUSTAT - has no
specific definition for
quick assets, but it can




- quick assets = cash +
rece i vabl es
Zavgren - unclear what
she used. She states in
verbiage that "if [one]
substitutes the current
ratio with the acid test








Recei vabl es COMPUSTAT - has four
different types. For






year . Lists i terns
included and excluded.
Rece i vabl es
| Sales COMPUSTAT - has two, net
and restated. For net -
this item represents
gross sales (the amount
of actual billings to
customers for regular
sales completed during
the period) reduced by
cash discounts, trade
discounts, and returned
sales and allowances for




| Total Assets Dagel and Pepper - the





[Total Assets COMPUSTAT - this item
represents current










| Total Capi tal COMPUSTAT - has four
different definitions
for total invested
capi tal . Used
definition 1 where it
equals long-term debt +
carrying of value
preferred stock + total
common stock + minority
interest. Pinches, et
al
. , (1973) then stated

































considered part of the








Working Capital Dagel and Pepper - the Total
difference between current





This appendix lists the three calculated measures for each
contractor used in the sample. In the first column is the
percent of DoD business for the contractor (CONTRACTOR
ABBREVIATION %DOD) determined from prime contracts
awarded/total revenue. Contractor abbreviations are listed in
Table 1. The second column lists the Dagel and Pepper Z-score
which was calculated for each contractor (CONTRACTOR DPZ) for
the given year. The third column lists the Zavgren financial
health measure (CONTRACTOR ZAV) which was calculated for each
contractor for the given year. The fourth column lists the
1982 constant dollar amount of prime contracts awarded to the
contractor (CONTRACTOR PC82) . The last column lists the
change in prime contract awards for the contractor (CONTRACTOR
DELPC)
.
After the contractor data, other variables used for the
analysis are listed.
BOE%DOD BOEDPZ BOEZAV BOEPC82 BOEDELPC
1975 42 0% 2.488 0.5124 2,885.08 30.3%
1976 30 0% 4.508 0.5396 2,017.75 -30. 1%
1977 39 3% 4.947 0.5460 2,507.75 24.3%
1978 27 9% 5.075 0.5512 2,261 .80 -9.8%
1979 18 6% 5.067 0.5492 2,071 .82 -8.4%
1980 25 3% 3. 106 0.5404 2,919.78 40.9%
1981 27 4% 0.856 0.5328 2,919. 19 0.0%
1982 35 8% -0.842 0.5131 3,238.80 10.9%
1983 39 7% 0.836 0.5344 4,240.41 30.9%
1984 44 1% 1 .601 0.5335 4,241 .46 0.0%
1985 40 0% 3.640 0.5396 4,966.70 17. 1%
1986 24 9% 3.792 0.5425 3,634.76 -26.8%
1987 24 1% 3.035 0.5375 3,322.94 -8.6%
1988 19 0% 3.613 0.5385 2,812. 16 -15.4%
1989 15 5% 2.840 0.5226 2,658.08 -5.5%
1990 8 2% 4.847 0.5305 1 ,870. 15 -29.6%
100
GD%DOD GDDPZ GDZAV GDPC82 GDDELPC
1975 59.7% 1 ,.716 0,,5012 2,382,, 17 -37,,5%
1976 56.6% 1 ,306 ,4999 1 ,840,,44 -22,,7%
1977 47.3% 1 .445 0,,5044 2, 176,,99 18,,3%
1978 129.6% 1 .219 ,5052 6, 162,,53 183, , 1%
1979 86.0% 2,,433 0,,4999 4,777,,21 -22,,5%
1980 74.2% 1 ,769 0,,4862 4,305,,88 -9,,9%
1981 67.2% 2 ,052 0,,4775 3,702,,37 -14, , 0%
1982 95.7% 2 ,591 0,,5109 5,891
,
, 10 59, , 1%
1983 95.4% 3 .192 0,,5193 6,537,,21 1 1 , 0%
1984 75.9% 2 ,698 0.,5249 5,531 , , 17 -15 ,4%
1985 91. 1% ,920 0,,4732 6,769,,71 22 ,4%
1986 90. 1% 0,,613 ,5145 7, 154,,44 5,,7%
1987 75.4% 0,,626 ,5155 6,264,,20 -12 ,4%
1988 68.3% -0,,693 ,5173 5,676,,35 -9 ,4%
1989 71.8% -1
,
,326 0,,4669 6,094,,01 7 ,4%
1990 64.7% -1 ,585 ,5046 5,432,,21 -10,,9%
GE%DOD GEDPZ GEZAV GEPC82 GEDELPC
1975 9.0% 2.647 0.5255 2,336,,75 -6.3%
1976 8.6% 2.869 0.5344 2,310 .33 -1 . 1%
1977 8.7% 3.008 0.5378 2,412, , 1 1 4.4%
1978 9. 1% 3. 151 0.5365 2,650,,52 9.9%
1979 9. 1% 3.317 0.5353 2,794,,08 5.4%
1980 8.8% 3.277 0.5310 2,695,,28 -3.5%
1981 11.1% 3.282 0.5314 3,284,,03 21.8%
1982 13.8% 3.397 0.5313 3,654, , 10 11.3%
1983 16.9% 3.397 0.5288 4,331 , 75 18.5%
1984 16.2% 3.300 0.5260 4, 195,,60 -3. 1%
1985 22.3% 3.279 0.5253 5,748,,94 37.0%
1986 20.2% 2.033 0.5212 6,342, , 16 10.3%
1987 15.3% 1 .737 0.5262 5,355,,24 -15.6%
1988 15.4% 1 .816 0.5176 5, 193,,20 -3.0%
1989 14.7% 2.022 0.5143 5,096,,93 -1.9%
1990 13.4% 2.119 0.5080 4,742,,78 -6.9%
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GM%DOD GMDPZ GMZAV GMPC82 GMDELPC
1975 1 . 1% 3.852 0.5281 721 .60 17.0%
1976 0.7% 5.035 0.5305 592.07 -17.9%
1977 0.7% 4.978 0.5234 603.35 1 .9%
1978 0.7% 5. 167 0.5259 622.45 3.2%
1979 0.7% 4.828 0.5196 614.40 -1 .3%
1980 0.9% 2.998 0.5213 622.77 1 .4%
1981 1 .0% 2. 170 0.5121 676.41 8.6%
1982 1 . 1% 1 .994 0.5268 689.52 1 .9%
1983 1 .2% 3.661 0.5359 856.61 24.2%
1984 1 .2% 3.835 0.5385 946.74 10.5%
1985 1 .7% 3.051 0.5257 1 ,468.76 55. 1%
1986 4.9% 2.323 0.5226 4 ,526. 16 208.2%
1987 4.0% 1 .563 0.5240 3 ,631 .43 -19.8%
1988 3.2% 1 .632 0.5298 3 ,089.80 -14.9%
1989 3.3% 1 . 125 0.5307 3 , 120.46 1 .0%
1990 3.7% 0.012 0.5266 3 ,388.26 8.6%
GRU%DOD GRUDPZ GRUZAV GRUPC82 GRUDELPC
1975 101 1% 483 0.5287 2 ,483 06 75 7%
1976 65 4% 1 872 0.5231 1 ,684 44 -32 2%
1977 92 0% 2 784 0.5214 2 ,266 76 34 6%
1978 81 1% 1 890 0.5241 1 ,750 79 -22 8%
1979 92 4% 1 137 0.5220 1 ,866 15 6 6%
1980 76 4% -0 634 0.5239 1 ,618 14 -13 3%
1981 89 3% -2 393 0.5258 1 ,861 12 15 0%
1982 94 9% -0 280 0.5252 1 ,900 49 2 1%
1983 103 5% 1 451 0.5225 2 202 97 15 9%
1984 94 6% 1 681 0.5422 2 248 18 2 1%
1985 89 6% 1 720 0.5226 2 486 68 10 6%
1986 86 3% 1 511 0.5244 2 649 55 6 5%
1987 102 0% -0 102 0.5255 3 018 43 13. 9%
1988 79 3% -0 . 170 0.5049 2 478 43 -17. 9%
1989 67 7% -0 718 0.5082 2 006 03 -19. 1%
1990 67 6% -0 477 0.5111 2 225 22 10. 9%
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HON%DOD HONDPZ HONZAV ]30NPC82 HONDELPC
1975 12.7% 1 .976 0.5282 538.75 -6.8%
1976 15.5% 2.694 0.5325 661 .53 22.8%
1977 15.7% 2.673 0.5341 724.89 9.6%
1978 15.4% 2.782 0.5261 808. 16 11.5%
1979 15.6% 2.400 0.5172 899.67 11.3%
1980 14.0% 2.207 0.5205 840.90 -6.5%
1981 15.7% 1 .864 0.5227 912.09 8.5%
1982 22.2% 2.221 0.5232 1 ,217.21 33.5%
1983 19.4% 2.353 0.5309 1 ,067.98 -12.3%
1984 22.3% 2.243 0.5286 1 ,258.76 17.9%
1985 38.2% 2.396 0.5262 1 ,735.77 37.9%
1986 34.3% 1 .052 0.5006 1 ,648.61 -5.0%
1987 30.0% 2.204 0.5260 1 ,786.47 8.4%
1988 19.1% 1 .493 0.5112 1 , 188.71 -33.5%
1989 25.7% 2.734 0.5178 1 ,314.81 10.6%
1990 22.0% 2.757 0.5275 1 , 145.33 -12.9%
IBM%DOD IBMDPZ IBMZAV IBMPC82 IBMDELPC
1975 2.5% 7.471 0.5348 665.59 28.2%
1976 1 .6% 7.356 0.5377 438.92 -34. 1%
1977 3.0% 6.746 0.5370 868.48 97.9%
1978 1 .9% 5.808 0.5313 588. 19 -32.3%
1979 2.4% 4.476 0.5323 755.90 28.5%
1980 1 .9% 4.443 0.5207 608.27 -19.5%
1981 2.8% 4.342 0.5183 875.49 43.9%
1982 3.5% 4.728 0.5244 1 , 196.83 36.7%
1983 3.5% 4.977 0.5296 1 ,362.67 13.9%
1984 3.4% 4. 151 0.5236 1 ,460.64 7.2%
1985 3.6% 3.215 0.5254 1 ,622. 18 11.1%
1986 2.7% 2.701 0.5295 1 ,213.59 -25.2%
1987 3.3% 2.050 0.5291 1 ,620.66 33.5%
1988 1 .8% 2.277 0.5251 926.60 -42.8%
1989 2. 1% 2.011 0.5224 1 , 106.26 19.4%
1990 1 .9% 2. 100 0.5188 1 ,060.87 -4. 1%
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LIT%DOD LITDPZ LITZAV LITPC82 LITDELPC
1975 30.4% 1 .045 0.5087 1 ,918.76 0.7%
1976 29.2% 1 .092 0.5056 1 ,677.92 -12.6%
1977 17.7% 1 .472 0.5132 967. 12 -42.4%
1978 42.6% 0.754 0.5145 2,310.29 138.9%
1979 20.4% 2.862 0.5479 1 , 138.70 -50.7%
1980 15.4% 3.268 0.5490 798.51 -29.9%
1981 28.0% 3.725 0.5498 1 ,507.00 88.7%
1982 26.6% 3.369 0.5470 1 ,316.60 -12.6%
1983 46.0% 3. 135 0.5474 2,079.51 57.9%
1984 53.0% 3.502 0.5482 2,268.35 9. 1%
1985 33.3% 1 . 167 0.5635 1 ,390.79 -38.7%
1986 36.8% 0.884 0.5631 1 ,485.07 6.8%
1987 46. 1% 0.579 0.5563 1 ,810.85 21.9%
1988 52.7% 0.467 0.5536 2,229. 17 23.1%
1989 28.6% 0.444 0.5511 1 ,214.38 -45.5%
1990 30.6% 0.559 0.5536 1 ,300.49 7. 1%
LOC%DOD LOCDPZ LOCZAV LOCPC82 LOCDELPC
1975 61.4% 0.071 0.5350 3,845.29 27.6%
1976 47. 1% 1 .081 0.5484 2,589.79 -32.7%
1977 50.0% 1 .733 0.5503 2,656.23 2.6%
1978 63.9% 1 .209 0.5208 3,303.31 24.4%
1979 44.3% 0.368 0.5214 2,457.79 -25.6%
1980 37.8% 0.349 0.5121 2,493.32 1 .4%
1981 51 .3% 1 .024 0.5224 2,890.72 15.9%
1982 62.3% 1 .617 0.5036 3,498.55 21.0%
1983 61 .7% 3.110 0.4995 3,840.57 9.8%
1984 61 .2% 4.936 0.4836 4,616.62 20.2%
1985 53.3% 5.374 0.4756 4,624.63 0.2%
1986 47.7% 2.760 0.4956 4,371 .71 -5.5%
1987 50.3% 3.351 0.4815 4,958.67 13.4%
1988 33.9% 3.798 0.5121 3,078.90 -37.9%
1989 36.9% 1 .446 0.4919 3,086.68 0.3%
1990 35.7% 2.064 0.5243 2,931 .21 -5.0%
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LTV%DOD LTVDPZ LTVZAV LTVPC82 LTVDELPC
1975 8.5% 0.314 0.5203 676.,91 22.7%
1976 7.0% -0.062 0.5273 541 ,.75 -20.0%
1977 6.3% 0.581 0.5149 469.,67 -13.3%
1978 7.3% -1 . 192 0.5237 570.,38 21.4%
1979 5.6% 0.418 0.5157 612,,26 7.3%
1980 6.4% 0.419 0.5112 625,,34 2. 1%
1981 7.3% 0.819 0.5165 596,,73 -4.6%
1982 11.5% -1 .236 0.5297 548,,06 -8.2%
1983 29.3% -1 .254 0.4980 1 ,287,,51 134.9%
1984 23.5% -1 .729 0.4929 1 ,538,,35 19.5%
1985 19.3% -1 .698 0.4751 1 ,442,,22 -6.2%
1986 19.9% -8. 113 0.5230 1 ,289,,81 -10.6%
1987 17.2% -4.858 0.5213 1 , 163,.41 -9.8%
1988 12.9% -9.537 0.5348 819 .49 -29.6%
1989 11.9% -8. 120 0.5317 639 ,93 -21 .9%
1990 19.3% -8.359 0.5305 976 ,03 52.5%
MAM%DOD MAMDPZ MAMZAV MAMPC82 MAMDELPC
1975 30.4% 0.507 0.5128 592,.00 17. 1%
1976 20.5% 1 .272 0.5266 426,,53 -28.0%
1977 29.6% 2.090 0.5313 676,.80 58.7%
1978 30.7% 3.116 0.5319 799,.97 18.2%
1979 25. 1% 3.408 0.5305 706,.71 -11.7%
1980 30.9% 2.350 0.5162 989,.82 40. 1%
1981 39. 1% 1 .018 0.5112 1 ,400,.43 41.5%
1982 57.0% -1 .473 0.5015 2,008,,35 43.4%
1983 58.3% 0.380 0.4940 2, 178,,27 8.5%
1984 57.7% -0.024 0.4987 2,101,,06 -3.5%
1985 61.6% 2.886 0.5277 2,472,,60 17.7%
1986 61 .8% 2.856 0.5320 2,620,,89 6.0%
1987 72.0% 2.302 0.5265 3,315,,38 26.5%
1988 64.9% 2.503 0.5088 3,233,,34 -2.5%
1989 57.6% 2. 182 0.5045 2,820,,42 -12.8%




MCD%DOD MCI)DPZ MCDZAV MCDPC:82 MCDDIiLP
1975 42.9% -1 282 0.4926 2,583 99 -4 1%
1976 69.5% -0 . 198 0.4987 4,227 38 63 6%
1977 72.6% 878 0.5235 4,085 79 -3 3%
1978 69.3% 1 ,270 0.5254 4,248 21 4 0%
1979 61.2% 1 259 0.5142 4,417 49 4 0%
1980 53.5% .399 0.4529 3,973 75 -10 0%
1981 59.7% .985 0.4555 4,798 12 20 7%
1982 76.8% 1 ,370 0.5038 5,630 10 17 3%
1983 75.7% 2 641 0.5071 5,889 47 4 6%
1984 79.5% 2 .057 0.4568 7, 141 48 21 3%
1985 77.2% 1 .576 0.4860 8,059 27 12 9%
1986 52.0% 1 .497 0.4852 5,880 63 -27 0%
1987 56.4% 1 .450 0.4774 6,864 10 16 ,7%
1988 53. 1% .465 0.4939 6,964 96 1 .5%
1989 61 .2% -0 .632 0.4942 7,546 .24 8 .3%
1990 52.2% -1 .215 0.5036 7,004 .27 -7 .2%
NOR%DOD NORDPZ NORZAV NORPC82 NORDELPC
1975 62.8% 3.210 0.5251 1 , 146.62 13.5%
1976 117.0% 4.312 0.5398 2,538.91 121.4%
1977 65.4% 5. 103 0.5496 1 ,661 .38 -34.6%
1978 32.0% 4.574 0.5440 869.51 -47.7%
1979 50.6% 2.713 0.5312 1 ,094.77 25.9%
1980 74. 1% 2.516 0.5393 1 ,502.25 37.2%
1981 31.3% 2.966 0.5312 677.93 -54.9%
1982 64.6% 3.352 0.5250 1 ,598. 19 135.7%
1983 26.0% 4. 174 0.5080 811 .76 -49.2%
1984 23.9% 3.996 0.4531 819.78 1 .0%
1985 23.6% 5.070 0.4595 1 ,087.25 32.6%
1986 13.2% 4.231 0.4529 662.52 -39. 1%
1987 17.6% 4. 148 0.4507 950.38 43.4%
1988 9.2% 3.078 0.4543 463.57 -51 .2%
1989 12.0% 2.184 0.4566 533.46 15. 1%
1990 13.6% 2.463 0.5235 615.87 15.4%
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RAY%DOD RAYDPZ RAYZAV RAYPC82 RAYDELPC
1975 30.3% 3.258 0.5271 1
,
257,,98 -17.3%
1976 31 .9% 3.977 0.5456 1 ,345.,53 7.0%
1977 36.9% 3.920 0.5446 1 ,652,,27 22.8%
1978 40.3% 4.444 0.5433 1 ,938,,85 17.3%
1979 33.5% 4.268 0.5356 1 ,709, , 13 -11.8%
1980 34.9% 3.797 0.5248 2
,
135,,99 25.0%
1981 32.4% 3.900 0.5238 1 ,986,,88 -7.0%
1982 41.0% 4.244 0.5261 2 ,262,,29 13.9%
1983 46.0% 4.216 0.5273 2 ,615,,85 15.6%
1984 51.6% 4.220 0.5225 2 ,874,,57 9.9%
1985 46.8% 4.744 0.5079 2 ,728,,53 -5. 1%
1986 55.4% 4.863 0.4998 3 ,617,,48 32.6%
1987 49.9% 3.453 0.4814 3 ,398,,56 -6. 1%
1988 49.5% 2.943 0.4805 3 ,529,,46 3.9%
1989 42.8% 2.581 0.4821 3
,
178,,94 -9.9%
1990 43.9% 2.281 0.4867 3 ,358,,87 5.7%
ROC%DOD ROCDPZ ROCZAV ROCPC82 ROCDELPC
1975 15.2% 1 .079 0.5168 1 ,353.62 -19.7%
1976 18.6% 2.093 0.5148 1 ,656.87 22.4%
1977 25.3% 2.876 0.5368 2 ,348.89 41 .8%
1978 15.7% 2.817 0.5336 1 ,320.78 -43.8%
1979 11.1% 2.857 0.5362 935.56 -29.2%
1980 14.0% 3. 123 0.5359 1
,
186.33 26.8%
1981 16.0% 3.483 0.5380 1 ,225.21 3.3%
1982 36.4% 3.830 0.5350 2 ,690.52 119.6%
1983 56. 1% 4.369 0.5367 4 ,357.73 62.0%
1984 66.7% 4.527 0.5375 5 ,780.06 32.6%
1985 55.3% 3.484 0.5211 5 ,699.77 -1 .4%
1986 45.5% 3.720 0.5294 4 ,990.79 -12.4%
1987 18.5% 3. 167 0.5355 1 ,990.97 -60. 1%
1988 18.3% 2.884 0.5304 1 ,900.67 -4.5%
1989 17.0% 3.002 0.5108 1 ,802.88 -5. 1%
1990 17.9% 2.635 0.5144 1 ,829.45 1 .5%
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TEX%DOD TEXDPZ TEXZAV TEXPC82 TEXDELPC
1975 22.2% 0.972 0.4876 1 ,009.06 17.4%
1976 14. 1% 1 .659 0.5168 637.63 -36.8%
1977 16.2% 1 .658 0.5281 721 .74 13.2%
1978 26.9% 1 .993 0.5224 1 ,287. 12 78.3%
1979 14.0% 1 .752 0.4877 652.01 -49.3%
1980 17.1% 0.742 0.4819 708.37 8.6%
1981 14.4% 0.964 0.4779 521 .20 -26.4%
1982 19.9% 0.719 0.5069 583.69 12.0%
1983 22.5% 1 .067 0.5181 643.51 10.2%
1984 25.0% 1 .217 0.4933 748.21 16.3%
1985 47.5% -1. 122 0.4926 1 ,746.60 133.4%
1986 41 . 1% -1 .216 0.4936 1 ,721 .88 -1 .4%
1987 32.2% -0.119 0.4621 1 ,542.69 -10.4%
1988 27.8% 0.086 0.4623 1 ,296.20 -16.0%
1989 22.4% -0. 126 0.4442 1 ,001 .30 -22.8%
1990 21.7% 0.086 0.4808 982. 16 -1 .9%
UT%DOD UTDPZ UTZAV UTPC82 UTDELPC
1975 36.3% 0.470 0.5256 2,601 .57 4.3%
1976 23.9% 2.028 0.5315 2, 115. 12 -18.7%
1977 28.5% 2.866 0.5361 2,515.37 18.9%
1978 38.3% 1 .222 0.5218 3,560.52 41.6%
1979 28.2% -0.018 0.5060 3,493.23 -1 .9%
1980 25.2% 0.702 0.5009 3,805.26 8.9%
1981 27.6% 1 . 196 0.5014 4, 108.37 8.0%
1982 31.0% 1 .213 0.4943 4,208.29 2.4%
1983 26.4% 1 .521 0.5044 3,708.00 -11.9%
1984 19.6% 1 .410 0.5023 2,980.30 -19.6%
1985 26. 1% 1 .481 0.5276 3,553.80 19.2%
1986 22.5% 0.999 0.5073 3, 149. 12 -11.4%
1987 20.9% 0.598 0.5130 3,191 .30 1 .3%
1988 19.5% 0.927 0.4997 3,053. 14 -4.3%
1989 18.2% 1 .523 0.5019 3,006. 16 -1 .5%
1990 13.3% 1 .345 0.4955 2,356.24 -21.6%
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1975 2695.0 -1 .3 586.0
1976 2825.6 4.9 609.8
1977 2958.4 4.7 622.6
1978 3115.2 5.3 652.2
1979 3192.4 2.5 660. 1
1980 3187. 1 -0.2 699. 1
1981 3248.8 1 .9 726.5




1984 3501 .4 6.8 788. 1
1985 3618.7 3.4 849.7
1986 3717.9 2.7 868.0
1987 3845.3 3.4 858.5
1988 4016.9 4.5 880.8
1989 4117.7 2.5 909.6





1975 73.0 3.2 159.9
1976 72.0 -1 .3 153.6
1977 80.0 11 .0 154.4
1978 88.4 10.5 155.0
1979 86.5 -2.2 159.2
1980 94.0 8.7 164.0
1981 106.0 12.7 171 .4
1982 116.7 10. 1 185.3
1983 122.9 5.3 201 .2
1984 124.2 1 .0 211 .4
1985 137. 1 10.4 230.0
1986 130. 1 -5. 1 244. 1
1987 126.8 -2.5 250.9
1988 119.2 -6.0 252.7
1989 109.0 -8.5 256.6
1990 107.9 -1 .0 247.0
PRO+RDT&E DELTA CAPACITY
82$ PRO+RDT&E UTILIZATION
1975 46.0 -6.2 *
1976 42.7 -7.3 76.2%
1977 44.4 0.6 78.7%
1978 45.2 1 .9 83.6%
1979 50.0 10.6 85.4%
1980 51 .6 3.2 75.6%
1981 54.9 6.5 77. 1%
1982 61 .0 11.1 63.9%
1983 71 .1 16.6 70.8%
1984 79.0 11 .0 81 .1%
1985 88.7 12.3 77.2%
1986 97. 1 9.5 74.5%
1987 101 .8 4.8 76.5%
1988 97.5 -4.2 81.0%
1989 100.3 2.9 81.3%
1990 97.7 -2.5 81 . 1%
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